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INTRODUCTION: CHRISTIANITY IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE 
In an ancient account of Christian martyrdom, the letter of the Church of Smyrna to the 
Church of Philomelium tells of the death of Polycarp. When this bishop of Smyrna was brought 
before a Roman official, the following exchange took place:  
 The proconsul said: “I have wild beasts. I shall throw you to them, if you 
do not change your mind [about professing to be a Christian].” 
 But [Polycarp] said: “Call them. For repentance from the better to the 
worse is not permitted to us; but it is noble to change from what is evil to what is 
righteous.” 
 And again he said to him, “I shall have you consumed with fire, if you 
despise the wild beasts, unless you change your mind.” 
 But Polycarp said…“Come, do what you will.” 
 And when he had said these things and many more besides...the proconsul 
was astonished, and sent his own herald into the midst of the arena to proclaim 
three times: “Polycarp has confessed himself to be a Christian.” 
When this was said by the herald, the entire crowd of heathens and Jews 
who lived in Smyrna shouted with uncontrollable anger and a great cry: “This one 
is the teacher of Asia, the father of the Christians, the destroyer of our gods, who 




 Roman statesman Pliny the Younger has also left behind a record of the treatment of 
Christians in the Roman Empire. When Christians were brought to trial before him, Pliny would 
ask them first, if they were Christians; and then, if they were, to denounce Christ and honor the 
emperor and the Graeco-Roman gods (Epistulae 10.96.3). He wrote this about those who refused 
to reject Christ:  
If they admitted it, I asked them a second and a third time threatening them with 
execution. Those who remained obdurate I ordered to be executed, for I was in no 
doubt, whatever it was which they were confessing, that their obstinacy and their 




Fed to lions and other wild beasts, executed at the hands of their own government for simply 
bearing the name of “Christian” – such were the dangers that have informed the modern-day 
                                                 
1
 Trans. Shepherd Jr. 1970:153 
2
 Trans. Walsh 2006:278 
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understanding of the early Christian experience. Indeed, despite the long, complex history of 
Christianity, the stories of martyrdom and persecution are the defining feature of its beginnings. 
And it is true that Christians in the Roman Empire faced the threat of governmental action 
against them, as Pliny’s comments show, and even sustained periods of persecution. De Ste. 
Croix identifies three “phases” of Roman persecution: “The first ends just before the great fire at 
Rome in 64; the second begins with the persecution which followed the fire and continues until 
250; and the third opens with the persecution under Decius in 250-1 and lasts until 313…”
3
 He 
places the deaths of apostles like Stephen and James in the first phase; the famous Neronian 
persecution recorded by Tacitus (Annales 15.44) in the second phase, and the persecutions led by 
the emperors Decius and Diocletian in the third phase.  
 There is, however, more to the story of early Christianity beyond these notable periods of 





 century AD. In those 300 years, Christians certainly did not face constant 
persecution and “there were also quite long periods during which the Christians enjoyed 
something like complete peace…”
4
 Thus, while the vivid stories of Christians being fed to the 
lions and otherwise executed by Roman officials may loom the largest in modern understanding 
of the early Christian church, they are only one aspect of a complex clash between Christianity 
and its surrounding Roman culture. There is simply much more nuance to discover in the first 
centuries of Christianity’s existence. 
 This thesis aims to take part in that discovery by looking away from the popular stories of 
Christianity’s tumultuous beginnings and towards the interim periods of relative peace between 
persecutions. Indeed, in following De Ste. Croix’s timeline, there is a noticeable gap between 
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Nero’s persecution in 64 AD and Decius’ in 250 AD. How were Christians interacting with the 
Roman Empire in those roughly 200 years? While a complete answer to that question is far 
beyond the scope of this thesis, much insight can still be gained by examining one particular part 
of the clash between Christians and the Roman Empire. To that end, this thesis will examine the 
works of the 2
nd
-century philosopher Celsus and the Christian apologist Origen. Celsus’ Λόγος 
Ἀληθής (ca. 175 AD), a treatise attacking Christianity, and Origen’s Contra Celsum (ca. 250 
AD), an answer to Celsus’ attacks, preserve for modern readers a profound look into the beliefs 




 century Roman Empire. Celsus’ treatise is the 
most substantial extant work against the Christians. In it, he displays his deep disdain for 
Christianity by criticizing nearly every aspect of the faith. This thesis will focus in particular on 
his criticisms of Christian doctrine, the Christian God, and Christian people. Celsus finds 
essentially nothing to be praised in Christianity, zealously and thoroughly deconstructing many 
of its teachings. Because he addresses so many aspects of Christianity, Celsus’ treatise allows 
modern readers to understand the complex set of complaints that Graeco-Romans like Celsus had 
about Christianity.  
 The thoroughness that Celsus displays in his attack on Christianity is equally matched by 
Origen’s point by point refutation of his arguments. Indeed, it is only due to Origen’s extensive 
citation of Celsus’ words that the Λόγος Ἀληθής remains in such a great quantity today. Just as 
Celsus’ work reveals much about Graeco-Roman thought, Origen’s stands as an important 
demonstration of early Christian thought. In combatting Celsus’ attacks and promoting 
Christianity, his work is a significant look into the beliefs of Christians before the Biblical canon 
was officially closed and the creeds of the Church were written. However, the value of Origen’s 
work goes even beyond the content. Origen employs a fascinating and nuanced apologetic 
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strategy in his answer to Celsus. This thesis argues that Origen, although clearly arguing against 
Celsus’ criticisms, actually employs the very kind of arguments for the Christian faith that 
Celsus had criticized in his treatise. As such, Origen’s apologetic strategy, as exemplified in the 
preface and Book 1 of Contra Celsum, did not show that Celsus’ criticisms of Christians were 
incorrect, but proved that these criticisms were founded in truth. In particular, I will show how a 
focus on the common man, the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, resonances with Graeco-
Roman philosophy, and the belief in the historical incarnation of Jesus - all things which Celsus 
criticizes - can be found explicitly in Origen’s work. 
 In order to unfold Origen’s response to Celsus’ work, the chapters of this thesis will be as 
follows. The remainder of the introduction will examine the religion of the Graeco-Roman world 
to provide a background for this specific interaction between Origen and Celsus. Chapter 1 will 
explore the lives of Celsus and Origen, with special attention to their similarities and differences. 
Chapters II and II will be, respectively, analyses of Celsus’ arguments against Christianity and 
Origen’s apologetic strategy in answering him. Finally, I will conclude by discussing the many 
intriguing questions that are raised by Origen’s strategy in the Contra Celsum. The most obvious 
is: Why would Origen undertake such a large project of answering Celsus so thoroughly if he 
does not seem concerned to prove his criticisms wrong? Further, an analysis of Origen’s 
argument also reveals his own understanding of the power of God and the role of man in 
spreading the Christian message. Thus, the following can also be asked: Does Origen believe that 
any apologetic effort at all can effect change in the unconverted? Finally, Origen’s impressive 
work has implications for how modern Christians ought to approach their own apologetic battles. 
The last question, then, is: Should Christians today imitate the unique strategy employed by 
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Origen in his defense against Celsus? This thesis aims to provide insight into all three of these 
questions through the course of its analysis of Origen’s Contra Celsum. 
 Before turning to Celsus and Origen, however, it will be helpful to get a sense of the 
broader context in which they were writing. In particular, it is important to look at the broader 
religious atmosphere of the Roman Empire that sometimes sparked the violence described in 
Polycarp’s martyrdom and Pliny’s encounters with Christians. In both of these examples, there is 
explicit mention that Christians were executed because they would not denounce their religion 
and properly recognize the gods of the Roman Empire.
5
 So, although political and even 
economic concerns were tightly bound up with public Roman religion, the primary battleground 
between Christians and the Empire was the question of religious beliefs and practice. The first 
major component of the religion in the Empire is what Case describes as a “complete 
syncretism” of different religious movements. She writes:  
The absence of the particularistic attitude in Roman religion made it inevitable 
that many cults would freely appropriate features from others, until it became 
difficult for an observer to draw lines of sharp demarcation between them. While 
certain gods retained their distinctive characteristics, the tendency to fuse the 
attributes and functions of one with another made rapid progress during the later 




Thus, the Christian belief in the one true God that demanded complete devotion from his 
followers would have stood in stark contrast to the divided attention of Roman religious practice. 
Van Andringa gives a more in-depth look at this mix of religious allegiances in Rome during the 
2
nd
 century AD. He notes that religions in Rome displayed a mix of provincial and imperial 
influences. Arguing against the idea that there was a distinct line between local gods and Roman 
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 Note that the excerpt from Pliny cited above does not make mention of the second part – that Christians must turn 
back to the Roman gods once they denounced Christ. However, later in the letter, Pliny writes (trans. Walsh 
2006:278): “Those who denied that they were or had been Christians and called upon the gods after me…I ordered 
to be acquitted” (Epistulae 10.96.5). Thus, only Christians who “called upon the gods after” Pliny could be cleared 
of their charges. 
6
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gods, he suggests that the gods of the Roman Empire were assimilated into those local 
communities. He writes: “Rather than focusing on ‘indigenous’ and ‘Roman’ gods, the point was 
to worship familiar gods and cults whose power was guaranteed by municipal investiture, gods 
who also established a connection with Rome and were adapted to their times, the situation of 
individuals and their place in society.”
7
 It seems that cities throughout the Empire retained their 
own local identity by continuing to worship their own gods, yet at the same time integrated some 
Roman gods and practices into their existing religion. In this way, they could honor all those who 
ensured the prosperity of that community: the local deities and the human government providing 
a stable environment in which to worship those deities. As Van Andringa concludes: “The 
populations of the empire knew that peace and happiness depended as much on divine 
benevolence as on the emperor’s immense powers.”
8
 As Christians became more prominent in 
the Empire and rejected a polytheistic concept of the divine, they were thus rejecting the 
goodwill of those gods towards their people. 
 Moreover, Christians also rejected devotion to the emperor, the other guarantor of the 
Empire’s prosperity. The worship of Roman emperors started with Augustus, although this 
dimension of Roman religion developed slowly. Initially, as Wissowa describes, worship of 
Augustus was not standard across the Empire: “Private persons and individual 
communities…established temples and shrines to the emperor, created priests for him and 
founded collegia for his cult without further ado.”
9
 Wissowa goes on to note that these sporadic 
pockets of worship for the emperor were still subjugated to worship of local deities. Moreover, 
Augustus himself was hesitant to establish cults which were dedicated to worshipping him. 
Suetonius records this in his biography of Augustus in De Vita Caesarum:  
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Templa, quamvis sciret etiam proconsulibus decerni solere, in nulla tamen 
provincia nisi communi suo Romaeque nomine recepit. Nam in urbe quidem 
pertinacissime abstinuit hoc honore; atque etiam argenteas statuas olim sibi 
positas conflavit omnis exque iis aureas cortinas Apollini Palatino dedicavit. 
(Divus Augustus 52) 
 
He still accepted temples in no province, although he knew that it was customary 
that they be dedicated even to proconsuls, unless [they were dedicated] commonly 
with his own name and with the name of Rome. For even in the city he abstained 
from this honor most stubbornly; and he even melted all the silver statues once 





So, while Augustus was worshipped in certain places throughout the Empire, this type of 
religious devotion was not the primary one. This changed, however, after Augustus’ death when 
he was deified. His deification did not signal a new standard practice in Rome. Subsequent 
emperors were not universally deified, with the Julio-Claudian emperors promoting themselves 
as gods to an inconsistent degree.
11
 For example, Caligula was persistent in his push to be 
honored as a god, though this never became reality for him.
12
 It was not until Domitian, however, 
that a living emperor made it mandatory for the Roman people to recognize and worship him as a 
God. Wissowa notes that prayers and votive offerings were offered to the emperor as part of this 
worship and were performed for many different reasons: on January 3
rd
 as part of a general 
prayer for the imperial house; every year to mark the continuation of an emperor’s rule; when the 
emperor was ill; when he left for war; and many other such instances.
 13
 A mark of loyalty 
among those living in the Empire was to participate in these religious rites. Herz points out that 
“the emperor and his well-being were an indispensable precondition for the well-being of the 
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 Jones 1980:1024-1032 
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empire as a whole.”
14
 To promote the well-being of the emperor through worship of him was 
done in an effort to guarantee the health of the entire Empire. 
 Domitian’s successors did not continue to demand to be recognized as a god. Trajan, 
Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, and Marcus Aurelius were all deified only after their deaths.
15
 Thus, in 
these first 175 years or so of the Empire, it is clear that there were varying degrees of emperor 
worship due to the varying characters of the emperors themselves. Despite this variation, it is 
clear that emperor worship was now securely part of the Roman religious ideology. Whether in 
life or in death, the emperor was to be honored. When Christians came on the scene, however, 
they refused to take part in honoring the emperor and were thus guilty of refusing to do their part 
in ensuring the success of the Roman Empire as a whole.  
The Christian refusal to participate in this public worship reveals much about their 
ideology. Tertullian argues that while Christians do pray for their rulers and should hope for their 
continued prosperity, it would be a dishonor to the true God to regard emperors as deities 
(Apologeticum 29-35). Christians agreed that the emperors were essential factors in promoting 
the safety and strength of the Empire; they just would not go so far as to call them “gods” 
because of their role in doing so. Essentially, honoring the emperor and respecting his authority 
was a good thing insofar that it honored the one true God. To be thankful to God for a good ruler 
and to entreat God for that ruler’s continued success was an acceptable way to regard the 
emperor. To credit the goodness and success of an emperor to the man himself, however, was to 
disregard God’s hand in their rule and to elevate him above his rightful status.  This attitude 
results from the Christian understanding of “where their true authority lies,” as Williams puts it. 
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He writes: “It is God’s authority, not the emperor’s, which motivates submission.”
16
 In all parts 
of life, Christians are subject to God’s authority. It is not surprising therefore that this belief 
caused them problems in a society whose ruler had not only great earthly power, but was also 
viewed as a god. 
 The Christians’ place in the religious atmosphere of the Roman Empire was thus quite 
precarious. They rejected both major components of traditional religion: the Graeco-Roman gods 
and the emperor. In doing this, they were rejecting all the benefit that came from proper devotion 
to these two protectors of the Empire. Moreover, their scorning of public religious practice had 
major political implications and eventually led to the violence seen in Polycarp’s and Pliny’s 
narratives. As Rives describes, although the private religion of those in the Empire, such as 
Christianity, was largely uncontrolled, Roman officials “seem[ed] to have drawn a line at the 
point where these private pursuits began to affect people’s public identities or where private 
religious specialists began to acquire independent social power.”
17
 In other words, once 
Christians became so ubiquitous and began to cease from public religious ritual, they were both 
abdicating their responsibility in seeking favor for the Empire through devotion to its gods and 
challenging the power of the earthly authorities who oversaw public religion. In these ways, 
Christianity was truly counter-cultural in the Roman Empire during its beginnings. It is this 
atmosphere of contention over religious practice that defined the time period in which Celsus and 
Origen wrote. With this background in mind, this thesis will now turn to the specific part each of 
these two men played in this clash between Christianity and the Empire. 
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CHAPTER ONE: CELSUS AND ORIGEN  
The backgrounds of Celsus and Origen are in themselves quite interesting and in those 
backgrounds, one can already begin to see the core of their debate on Christianity. They shared a 
common time in the late 2
nd
 to early 3
rd
 century, a common location in Alexandria, and were 
both learned men well-versed in the philosophy of their time period. Despite all of these 
similarities, however, they had diametrically opposite views on Scripture and the claims it made 
about God. This divergence on the question of Scripture ultimately informs the entire debate that 
plays out in the Λόγος Ἀληθής and Contra Celsum. For this reason, an in-depth examination into 
the lives and beliefs of these men is crucial for understanding their works. 
 
Similarities: Time, Place, and Platonism 
The first important element of Celsus’ and Origen’s backgrounds is when they lived. 
Both men lived in the 100 years between 150 and 250 AD. They were therefore alive and 
integral parts of the growing intellectual dialogue between Christianity and its culture. Pliny the 
Younger and other writers early in the 2
nd
 century have little reaction to Christianity beyond 
dismay and suspicion. As exemplified in Pliny’s letter to Trajan, the hesitations about 
Christianity in these earlier works stemmed mainly from the perceived disruption that Christians 
created in Roman society. The zeal of those following this religion, combined with their 
abandonment of the traditional Roman religious rites, caused frustration for those people in the 
Empire observing their newly-Christian neighbors. As the 2
nd
 century continued, however, the 
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Celsus was among these writers who sought to undo the budding doctrine of the 
Christians with a more philosophical approach. However, nothing is known about Celsus except 
what he says about himself in his treatise and what Origen writes about him. Indeed, Wilken 
points out that Origen himself seemed hesitant about Celsus’ identity.
19
 Despite this scanty 
knowledge, the date of the Λόγος Ἀληθής can be estimated relatively confidently. Origen makes 
two comments that serve as the starting point for a discussion of when Celsus was writing his 
work. The first comes in the preface to Contra Celsum. Here, Origen writes that Celsus was οὐδὲ 
κοινοτέραν ζωὴν ζῶντος ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἔτι ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ πάλαι νεκροῦ (Praef. 4), “was no longer 
living the common life among men but was already dead for a long time.” Origen’s Contra 
Celsum has been dated to around 250 AD, as will be discussed later, so in light of this comment 
in the preface, Celsus’ treatise can be dated to a vague many years before 250 AD.   
 Origen’s second comment, however, provides a much more definite time period. In 1.8, 
he writes: Δύο δέ παρειλήφαμεν Κέλους γεγονέναι ’Επικουρείους, τόν μέν πρότερον κατά 
Νέρωνα, τοῦτον δέ κατά ‘Αδριανόν, καί κατωτέρω. “But we have heard that there are two (men 
named) Celsus the Epicurean, the first during the time of Nero, but this one during the time of 
Hadrian and following.” Thus, Origen believes Celsus to have lived during the reign of the 
emperor Hadrian (117-133 AD) and later. From these first two statements by Origen, then, 
Celsus wrote no earlier than 117 AD but had been dead for many years by 250 AD. 
 This still leaves a wide gap in which scholars must fill in the pieces. Chadwick provides a 
good overview of the debate in modern scholarship concerning a more exact date for Celsus’ 
Λόγος Ἀληθής.
20
 Chadwick essentially presents two main groups of arguments for Celsus’ date. 
The first of these main arguments for Celsus’ date contends that the Celsus of Λόγος Ἀληθής 
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fame is the same Celsus mentioned by Greek satirist Lucian in Alexander the False Prophet and 
in a letter written by Greek philosopher/physician Galen. Alexander the False Prophet is a satire 
written specifically for a friend of Lucian’s named Celsus, who seems to be an Epicurean.
21
 So, 
by name and by epithet, this could very well be the same Celsus. In addition, Keim, the most 
prominent proponent of this opinion, points to the fact that the Celsus in both Lucian and Origen 
is said to have written books against magic.
22
 Galen similarly mentions a letter he had written to 
Celsus the Epicurean, who had also written books against magic.
23
 If the Celsus in these two 
works is the same Celsus of Origen’s, then the lifetimes of both Lucian and Galen can give even 
further indication of when this Celsus lived and wrote. Lucian was born in 120 and his extant 
works date at least until 169.
24
 Galen was born in 130 and was writing at least around 170.
25
 
Assuming that Celsus, as a friend of these men, was around the same age, then it seems 
reasonable to say that he too was writing around 170 AD. 
 However, as with any question of dating an ancient writer, there are serious objections to 
the identification of Origen’s Celsus with the one mentioned by Lucian and Galen. The major 
objection to this is that while Celsus is called “Epicurean” in all of these works, his actual words 
recorded in the Contra Celsum lead many to the conclusion that he is not Epicurean at all, but a 
Platonist. Chadwick writes unequivocally that “his philosophy is that of Middle Platonism, and 
with Epicureanism he betrays no affinities at all.”
26
 Wilken agrees with Chadwick’s matter-of-
fact conclusion.
27
 Hoffmann, while not nearly as certain, does admit that “epicurean opinions are 
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not in bold relief in the passages cited in the Contra Celsum…”
28
 In his in-depth analysis of 
Celsus’ philosophical leanings, Bergjan notes that Origen identifies Celsus as an Epicurean in the 
first four books of the Contra Celsum and then ceases to do so from Book 5 on.
29
 This leads 
Bergjan to conclude the following: “The identification of Celsus with an Epicurean is a 
structuring motif developed in the introductory part of Contra Celsum and indicating a main 
topic of criticism.”
30
 That is, as Origen deals with Celsus’ critiques about the Christian view of 
God’s providence, he interprets Celsus as having an Epicurean understanding of the topic. Since 
Celsus, like the Epicureans, did not believe that the gods interfere in the lives of mortals, Origen 
associates him with this group.
31
 But, when Origen moves on to Celsus’ later arguments that do 
not concern the nature of God’s involvement with mortals, he abandons this epithet. Thus, the 
consensus of scholars is that Origen’s identification of Celsus was merely a shorthand way of 
describing one particular aspect of his philosophical thought, and that Origen’s Celsus is not the 
one of Lucian’s and Galen’s works.
 32
 
 Having effectively nullified this first main argument for dating Celsus, Chadwick is left 
only with the second way, which looks at two additional passages in the Contra Celsum. The 
first of these is found in 8.69, in which Origen quotes Celsus who seems to allude to the 
persecutions of the Christians. Celsus writes: “While in your case, if anyone does still wander 
about in secret, yet he is sought out and condemned to death.”
33
 Keim and Neumann have 
proposed that this statement refers to the persecution of Christians in 177 carried out by Marcus 
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 The second passage is 8.71 where Celsus uses the phrase οἱ νῦν βασιλεύοντες, “those 
ruling now.” As Chadwick points out, scholars argue that Celsus is referring to a time when there 
were two rulers at Rome. This happened twice during Marcus Aurelius’ reign (161-169 and 177-
180). Both Keim and Neumann believe that the 177-180 estimation is the best for the date of 
Λόγος Ἀληθής.
35
 Thus, Chadwick concludes that Celsus wrote the Λόγος Ἀληθής sometime 
between 177-180. Hoffmann and Wilken agree with this, with the former estimating “the last 
quarter of the 2
nd
 century” and the latter “around 170 AD.”
36
 Thus, a date of about 175 AD 
seems to be the consensus for the date of Celsus’ treatise.  
At about the same time that Celsus was composing the Λόγος Ἀληθής, Origen was born 
in Egypt (185 AD). Unlike Celsus, very much is known about Origen’s life. Danielou identifies 
three major sources for his life: Book VI of Eusebius’ Church History, the first book of the 
Apologia written about Origen by Eusebius and Pamphilus, and a speech made by Gregory of 
Neo-Caesarea, a student of Origen.
37
 He was born into a Christian family and his father, who 
was martyred in 202, saw to his education in Greek literature and the Christian Scriptures. With 
this good education and with persecutions forcing Christian teachers into hiding during the year 
206, Origen began to teach in secret at house churches in Alexandria. He soon became the 
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official successor of the famous Clement of Alexandria at a catechetical school. Danielou 
describes this school in the following way:  
[Origen] now realized that there was scientific work to be done on the Bible and 
that for that purpose secular learning was indispensable. The school he was going 
to found would thus have to be one in which secular studies could be pursued as a 
preparation for the scientific study of the Bible, the crown of the whole structure. 





In the founding of this school, Origen’s passion for studying and his recognition of the 
importance of study to the Christian life is clearly on display. 
 Although his time at the Alexandrian school came to an end in 230, Origen did not 
withdraw from his commitment to studying and teaching the Bible. He moved to Caesarea, 
where he lived until his death in 253 or 254. In Caesarea, he founded another school, preached 
nearly every day, and also became a prolific writer. Along with his doctrinal works such as De 
Principiis, he was one of the first to write commentaries on the Bible. According to Haykin, 
Origen wrote almost 300 books of commentaries on the Old Testament alone. But, there is also 
evidence of commentaries on the New Testament books of Matthew and John, as well as all of 
Paul’s letters.
39
 It was also during this time that he wrote the Contra Celsum, with an exact date 
of 248 AD being the most reasonable estimation. Eusebius dates it to this period and Chadwick 
notes that internal evidence confirms his date.
40
 Unfortunately, beyond Contra Celsum, relatively 
little of this large corpus remains today. Despite this, it is still abundantly clear that Origen had a 
great dedication to studying, interpreting, and teaching the Scriptures throughout his whole life. 
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In addition to their shared time period of the late 2
nd
 to early 3
rd
 century AD, Celsus and 
Origen were likely living in the same place. As already noted, Origen was born in and spent a 
significant portion of his life in Alexandria. As with the dating of these two men, Origen’s 
location is much more definite than Celsus’. While there is no definite evidence that Celsus lived 
in Alexandria, Chadwick and Niehoff provide convincing arguments for why he can be 
reasonably located here. Chadwick gives three reasons in support of Alexandria as Celsus’ home. 
Firstly, Celsus quotes, or at least shows familiarity with both Egyptian mythology and “the 
Logos-theology of Hellenistic Judaism.”
41
 This theology was developed by Philo of Alexandria 
and continued on in that location. Secondly, Origen often complains that Celsus confuses 
Gnostic teaching with what was becoming the orthodox teaching of Christianity. Chadwick 
argues that in Alexandria, unlike Rome, the distinction between Gnosticism and the more 
widely-accepted Christian teachings was blurred to such an extent that Celsus was more likely to 
be mixed up.
42
 And finally, Celsus gives an in-depth explanation in 6.22 of a Mithraic mystery, a 
cult which was flourishing in Alexandria at that time.
43
 Niehoff similarly notes Celsus’ 
familiarity with Philo’s philosophical legacy in Alexandria, while adding that Celsus’ Platonic 
beliefs “best fit an Alexandrian context.”
44
 Therefore, while Celsus cannot be located in 
Alexandria without any doubts, there is much evidence to suggest that this was the case. 
 Considering the sophisticated nature of Celsus’ and Origen’s works, it is unsurprising 
that they were both located in Alexandria. As Hinge and Krasilnikoff describe, this city was “the 
centre for communication of scientific and scholarly achievements as well as religious novelties, 
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 Alexandria was home to the famous Library and Museum, which 
were the epicenter of scholarly learning on a range of subjects including philosophy, religion, 
and mathematics. MacLeod writes that in the 3
rd
 century BC, “the Library possessed over 
400,000 mixed scrolls with multiple works, plus another 90,000 single scrolls.”
46
 While these 
large numbers were not consistent throughout all of antiquity, due most notably to the fire in 1
st
 
century BC that destroyed the library, MacLeod goes on to say: “For the seven hundred years, 
[from the 3
rd
 century BC] until the 4
th
 century AD, as many as a hundred scholars at a time came 
to the Library to consult this collection, to read, talk, and write.”
47
 
 This environment of intellectual opportunity and diversity is the one in which Celsus and 
Origen would have lived. The scope of the Library made it a natural place for a wide collection 
of different ideologies. Indeed, “by the beginning of the Common Era, Alexandria was a place 
where what could be known of Babylonian, Egyptian, Jewish and Greek thought was strenuously 
collected, codified, systematized, and contained.”
48
 It should be added here that Christian 
thought would soon be added to the dialogue within the city, evidenced by Clement’s and 
Origen’s school there. Therefore, Celsus and Origen would have had available to them a wide 
array of different philosophical, religious, and cultural ideas. Indeed, their works are proof that 
they were making their own contributions to the interacation that was occurring between the 
scholars living and studying there. With all this in mind, it is clear that the dialogue between 
Celsus and Origen was one outcome of a greater exchange of ideas in ancient Alexandria. 
 Their shared location also helps to explain a third commonality between Celsus and 
Origen: the Platonist influence clearly displayed in their works. As already alluded to, scholars 
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agree, by extrapolating from his arguments in Λόγος Ἀληθής, that Celsus was undoubtedly a 
Platonist, with some identifying him specifically as a Middle Platonist.
 49
 Some examples from 
Λόγος Ἀληθής that demonstrate his Platonist ideas have been enumerated by Freeman. He writes 
that Celsus believed in “a Supreme Good or God, who exists as a transcendental being above all 
things and beyond all emotions.” In addition, his criticism of the lack of serious philosophical 
thought among Christians results from his adherence to the Platonist idea that one can only know 
God through reason and philosophy. And finally, Celsus’ problem with the Christian worship of 
Jesus as a god seems to stem from his belief that, although there were intermediaries between 
humans and God, none of these intermediaries were God himself.
50
 Beyond these specific 
examples, Chapter 2 will demonstrate that Celsus, when comparing Christianity to Graeco-
Roman philosophy, pays special attention to how Christianity appropriates and ultimately 
denigrates the noble philosophy of Plato. Celsus’ consistent efforts to show the superiority of 
Platonist thought over Christianity therefore reveals his adherence to this particular philosophy. 
Similarly, scholars have pointed out the numerous Platonist aspects of Origen’s 
thought.
51
 Ramelli states unequivocally that Origen was a “Christian Platonist,” while Kenny 
notes the following Platonist ideas in Origen’s writings: the existence of human souls before 
birth, the “blessedness” awaiting all beings after death, and the resurrection of the body in 
spherical form.
52
 Indeed, his Platonist leanings were so strong that he conflicted with bishops in 
his local community and was banished from their fellowship until his death.
53
 This is perhaps the 
most interesting aspect of Origen’s relationship to Platonism. It is not surprising that he was 
influenced by this philosophy due to the time and place in which he lived. What is so notable, 
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however, is that the Platonist aspects of his writings are so immediate that they caused conflict 
with his contemporaries and given him a legacy as a “Christian Platonist.” This seems to indicate 
that when he came to Celsus’ own work, he would have shared a common philosophical 
language with him. 
 
Difference: Scripture 
It is clear, then, that Celsus and Origen had many significant things in common. 
However, their opposition on the question of Christianity demonstrates that there were still 
fundamental differences between them. Of these differences, none is more important than their 
view of the Christian Scriptures. Knowing the dates for Celsus’ and Origen’s lives and works 
allows us to evaluate what access each would have had to Christian Scriptures. This is significant 
especially when considering Celsus’ stated purpose in writing the Λόγος Ἀληθής: “...I have 
undertaken to compose a treatise for [the Christians’] edification, so that they can see for 
themselves the true character of the doctrines they have chosen to embrace and the true source of 
their opinions.”
54
 Celsus, in other words, aims to show the mistaken understanding that 
Christians have about the things they have been taught. Scarborough writes this about Celsus: 
His efforts are twofold. He begins his refutation [of Christianity] by first 
attempting to discredit Christianity at its genesis, and only then moves to address 
it in virtue of its social and historical implications. Thus, it is to the Scriptures 




Similarly, Scarborough argues that Origen’s “perspective, much like his opponent’s, begins and 
ends with the Scriptures.”
56
 Therefore, what Celsus and Origen knew of Christian Scripture and 
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the conclusions they draw from that basic knowledge is of utmost importance to understanding 
their conversation about Christianity. 
 To answer the question of what Celsus and Origen knew of Scripture, I will first look at 
the history of those Scriptural writings. The formation of the Christian canon was a long and 
complicated process. Indeed, even today, the different denominations of Christianity do not 
agree on what books belong in the Bible. My intention is not to enter into the complexities of this 
history, but only to gain a general idea of the state of the Scriptures at this time. Firstly, a couple 
of basic dates. The Septuagint, or the Greek translation of the Hebrew writings now called the 
Old Testament, was composed by Alexandrian Jews around 285 BC.
57
 As such, Bruce notes, the 
Christian church was armed with a sacred book from its first beginnings.
58
 Indeed, this is clear 
just from reading the multitude of references by New Testament writers to the Old Testament 
writings.
59
 It can be confidently said, then, that the Septuagint would have been a well-




 The trickier question is what Celsus and Origen would have known about the writings 
that now make up the New Testament. Shelley provides a helpful timeline of the development of 
the New Testament from 100-400 AD.
60
 Firstly, the New Testament as it is known today did not 
appear until the second half of the 4th century AD - well past the time this thesis considers.
61
 
However, Shelley gives snapshots of what collections of writings that Christians had in both 100 
and 200 AD, the bookends of Celsus’ lifetime. Except for the collection of Paul’s letters in the 
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 century, from 100-150 there is no evidence that Christians had collected their writings 
into a single religious book. Despite the lack of such a collection, there are extant Christian 
writings that quote from the Gospels and Paul’s letters, showing that these writings were known 
and used by Christians. By 150 AD, Matthew, Mark, and Luke were gathered into one collection. 
Shelley continues his timeline by citing evidence from a church in Rome. This evidence shows 
that in 200 AD, 23 of the 27 modern canonical New Testament books were used for teaching the 
congregation. The four Gospels, as well as Acts and most of Paul’s letters, were included in this 
list at the church in Rome. Interestingly, the next benchmark date comes in 250 AD with the list 
of books that Origen had in his personal library. He had 21 of the modern canonical books, again 
including the four Gospels, Acts, and most of Paul’s letters. 
 Considering this timeline, it seems that the Gospels, Acts, and many of Paul’s letters 
were the modern canonical books that were accepted and taught even at the very beginnings of 
the Christian church. It is for certain that Origen had familiarity with the books listed above, 
since they came from his own library. Moreover, as Martens writes, “Few commentators and 
homilists in the early church cultivated scholarship of the Christian Scriptures—the law, 
prophets, gospels, and apostolic writings—as exuberantly as he did.”
62
 In other words, Origen’s 
very legacy is one of deep and extensive Biblical knowledge. Unsurprisingly, the same cannot be 
said as certainly for Celsus. In view of the timeline of Christian canon, it is reasonable to believe 
that Celsus would have had an awareness of various Christian writings. At the very least, Celsus 
must have known the content of the four Gospels, as these show up in nearly every early 
collection of Christian Scripture.  
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There is however, more convincing evidence of Celsus’ knowledge of Scripture in his 
own work. His criticisms about Jesus, including the prophecies about Jesus in the Old Testament 
and stories of his life in the New Testament, are a major focus of his work. The connection of 
Old Testament prophecies to the person of Jesus and the events of Jesus’ life are taught primarily 
in the four Gospels, so Celsus surely had familiarity with these books. His own words also lead 
to this conclusion. For example, he writes: “Let us not omit this: The writings of the disciples 
contain only those facts about Jesus that put a flattering face on the events of his life.”
63
 
Similarly, he says: “Everywhere they speak in their writings of the tree of life…”
64
 In both of 
these examples, Celsus admits to his own personal reading of Christian writings, specifically 
those about Jesus. Thus, despite living at the same time that the Biblical canon was being 
formed, Celsus most likely would have read the widely-distributed Christian writings. As Young 
writes, “Despite the superficiality and childishness of some of his criticisms, despite his 
hollowness and ridicule, it must be confessed that he was truly a man of genuine learning.”
65
 
That is, whether or not Celsus’ treatment of Christian teachings was valid, there is no question 
that he knew them well. 
It is important to note that, since Celsus and Origen lived before the Christian canon had 
officially been closed, they likely read early Christian, non-canonical texts. As Rordorf writes, 
“The history of the formation of the New Testament canon is simultaneously the history of the 
progressive elimination of non-canonical or ‘apocryphal’ writings.”
66
 There is quite a large 
extant collection of early Christian writings, some of which were even formerly counted among 
New Testament lists. Harris identifies five such writings that could have been canon: The Epistle 
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of Barnabas, The Didache (concerning the teaching of the Twelve Apostles), 1 Clement, 
Apocalypse of Peter, and The Shepherd of Hermas.
67
 Perhaps most pertinent to a discussion of 
Celsus and Origen are the Nag Hammadi writings found in Egypt in 1945. This was a collection 
of 13 codices containing 50 individual documents, including Plato’s Republic and “dozens of 
noncanonical texts.”
68
 Many of these texts are Gnostic in origin, such as the Gospel of Thomas, 
the Gospel of Truth, and more. What is so significant about the Nag Hammadi writings is that 
places noncanonical works unquestionably in Egypt, where Celsus and Origen both lived. 
Indeed, the circulation of noncanonical Christian texts in this part of the world can simply be 
seen as part of the diverse set of influences that Celsus and Origen would have been in contact 
with in Alexandria. 
 Regardless of what Celsus and Origen knew as Christian Scripture, it is clear that they 
had wildly different estimations of it. Celsus’ major criticisms of Christianity, especially those 
concerning the Christian God and Christian doctrine, could have only been made in reaction to 
what he learned from their writings. Although there are certainly instances when Celsus criticizes 
Christian ideas that did not ultimately become orthodox,
69
 many of his main points of attack 
would still be valid against the Christianity of today. Celsus’ disbelief in and arguments against 
the divinity of Jesus, the Christian claims of universal truth, the resurrection of Jesus, and more 
all demonstrate his great familiarity with orthodox Christian teaching. Moreover, his consistently 
low opinion of that teaching reveals that he was not at all persuaded by Christianity. His work, 
therefore, is born out of this fundamental disbelief in the teaching of Scripture. 
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 Origen’s work, however, is subject to his belief that Scripture was true. Indeed, this is 
something he makes quite clear at the very beginning of his work, which will be discussed at 
length later in this thesis. What is important to notice at this point is that Celsus’ and Origen’s 
differing views on Christianity – a difference that is all the more significant in light of their 
shared time, place, and philosophy – are a result of their opposite views of Christian Scripture. 
Because of this, it can rightly be said that their conflict over Christianity is fundamentally a 
conflict over the truth of Christian teaching. Celsus’ work is a great elaboration on why the 
claims that Christians make are false, while the apologetic strategy Origen employs in his work 
is ultimately aimed at demonstrating the truth of those claims. With this framework in mind, 
















CHAPTER TWO: WHEREVER ONE FINDS A COMPANY OF FOOLS... 
In order to properly analyze Origen’s strategy in the Contra Celsum, it is necessary to 
look at Celsus’ own treatise first. The Λόγος Ἀληθής is reasonably dated to around 175 AD, as 
discussed previously. In this work, Celsus undertakes a comprehensive critique of Christianity 
that touches on many different features of the new faith. Due to the fact that his writing is only 
preserved today within Origen’s work, it is not possible to read Celsus’ treatise as a cohesive 
document. However, some reconstructions have been made by Bader, Glöckner, Keim, and 
Hoffmann.
70
 The first three scholars attempt to reconstruct the order of the Λόγος Ἀληθής, while 
Hoffmann’s arranges the fragments thematically. Though I will not be using the themes that 
Hoffmann identifies,
71
 the fragmentary nature of what remains of the treatise lends itself to this 
kind of analysis. Thus, I will follow his strategy in my own analysis of Celsus’ work. Celsus 
focuses his critique on three principle elements of Christianity: its doctrine, its God, and its 
followers. 
One preliminary note should be made. Because the only source of Celsus’ treatise is in 
Origen’s work against Celsus, it is reasonable to ask how objectively Origen records passages 
from Λόγος Ἀληθής. Scholars seem to be divided on their assessment of how reliable Origen is 
in his use of Celsus’ own words. Both Somos and Chadwick discuss the varying opinions on the 
question, with neither coming up with a definitive answer.
72
 Somos notes that earlier scholars 
(roughly in the first half of the 20th century) tend to be highly critical of Origen’s transmission, 
seeing his citation as selective and inaccurate. On the other hand, later scholars give Origen 
much more credit in general due to the thorough nature of his work. 
                                                 
70
 Hoffmann 1987:44 
71
 Hoffmann identifies 10 different themes, which I believe can be consolidated to only 3 while still capturing a 
complete picture of Celsus’ opposition to Christianity. 
72
 Chadwick 1980:xxii-xxiv; Somos 2012:200-201. Unfortunately, many of the scholars they cite do not write in 
English and could not be consulted directly. 
28 
 
 Despite the lack of scholarly consensus, it is possible to examine passages from Contra 
Celsum in which Origen actually comments on the extent to which he cites Celsus. Chadwick 
provides a helpful overview of these instances and lists 24 different times either when Origen 
admits to omitting or abbreviating Celsus’ words or when he has clearly summarized Celsus’ 
words. A good example of the former comes in 7.27, as Origen refutes Celsus’ attacks on how 
Christians describe God. After referencing a few words from Celsus, he writes:  
ἀνατρέπειν ἐθέλει τὰ μὴ τεθειμένα ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἅπερ περισσὸν παραθέσθαι ἢ τὴν 
ἀνατροπὴν αὐτῶν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἃ λέγει ἡμᾶς φάσκειν περὶ θεοῦ ἐλέγομεν, καὶ πρὸς 
αὐτὰ ἵστατο, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἡμῖν τὸ τιθέναι τὰς λέξεις αὐτοῦ καὶ κατα σκευάζειν 
μὲν τὰ ἡμέτερα λύειν δὲ τὰ ἐκείνου· (7.27) 
 
As he endeavours to overthrow notions which we do not maintain, it is 
superfluous to quote these remarks or to give them any refutation. If we said what 
he maintains we affirm about God, and if this had been the object of his attack, it 
would have been necessary for us to quote his words and to argue in support of 




As in many other sections of Contra Celsum, Origen omits words of Celsus when he finds the 
task to be “superfluous.” That is, when Celsus’ attacks are specious in Origen’s eyes, he does not 
even bother to note them. He gives them no attention because he does not believe them to be 
worthy of any. As he says in the latter part of the section just cited, only when Celsus actually 
engages with what Christians say does Origen undertake to refute his words. 
 The second group of passages in which Origen seems to misrepresent Celsus’ words are 
those in which he is clearly summarizing Celsus instead of giving direct quotations. For example, 
in 2.7, Origen deals with Celsus’ comments about Jesus. He writes:  
Δεικνύτωσαν δέ, ποῦ κἂν ἔμφασις λέξεως ἀπὸ ἀλαζο νείας προφερομένης παρὰ 
τῷ Ἰησοῦ εὑρίσκεται… Ἐλεγχέτω δέ τις, τίνα ἐψεύσατο, καὶ παραστησάτω 
μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ ψεύδη, ἵνα δείξῃ τὰ μεγάλα ψευσάμενον τὸν Ἰησοῦν… Τίνα δὲ 
καὶ τὰ ἀνόσια τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, ἀπαγγελλέτω καὶ μάλιστα ὁ παρὰ τῷ Κέλσῳ Ἰουδαῖος. 
(2.7) 
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I challenge anyone to show where there can be found even a suggestion of a 
saying uttered by Jesus from arrogance...I challenge anyone to prove what lies he 
told; and let him give an account of great and small lies, that he may prove that 
Jesus told great lies...And let Celsus’ Jew in particular tell us what were the 




The sections before and after 2.7 each discuss different critiques made by Celsus, which Origen 
does quote. So, it is clear that 2.7 is meant to stand alone as Origen handles a specific line of 
attack from Celsus’ work. However, he clearly does not introduce a unified passage from Celsus, 
but instead just alludes to Celsus’ arguments that Jesus was arrogant, told lies, and performed 
profane actions. In most other sections, such as 2.8, Origen explicitly writes phrases such as φησὶ 
δὲ, “But [Celsus] says” when he seeks to refute him. Thus, because he does not cite him directly 
yet still discusses a specific argument, he must only be summarizing what Celsus wrote. 
Taking the conclusions of scholars into account, as well as these instances of Origen’s 
clear omission of Celsus’ text, there seems to be good reason to find Origen’s transmission 
reliable. There are many reasons for this. Firstly, even though there are many passages in Origen 
in which he does not quote Celsus directly, he quotes him far more often than not in his eight 
book refutation. Nearly every section of the book considers a chunk of Celsus’ words and those 
sections that do not are frequently a continuation of Origen’s discussion of a passage introduced 
in preceding sections. Secondly, sections like 2.7 in which Origen is summarizing Celsus’ words 
are not strikingly different from those in which he does. That is, Celsus’ arguments that Origen 
only alludes to are thematically similar to his quoted arguments. Again, using 2.7 as an example, 
Celsus is surely dismissive of the Christian God - a fact which this chapter will show clearly. 
Thus, sections like this in which Origen alludes to Celsus’ accusations about Jesus are not out of 
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line with the overall tone and content of Celsus’ actual words. Thirdly, the fact that Origen does 
not shy away from mentioning when he is not willing to reference Celsus directly seems to 
indicate that he is not attempting to mislead his readers. He is not trying to truncate Celsus’ 
words so that his own arguments can appear stronger. He is transparent about why he does not 
quote Celsus in certain places and thus does not seem to have nefarious intentions. Finally, I 
stand with Chadwick’s estimation that “perhaps too much energy” has been spent on trying to 
sort out the reconstruction of Celsus’ text and thus how faithfully Origen transmits it.
75
 In the 
end, the benefits of studying Celsus through Origen’s text far outweigh any reservations modern 
readers ought to have. Seeing that Celsus’ work is the most substantial one that remains of 
Graeco-Roman opinion about Christianity, Origen’s transmission should be appreciated far more 
than suspected. 
 Origen’s thorough citation of Celsus’ text has preserved for modern readers a work of 
rich and varied attacks on Christianity. Celsus’ opposition to Christianity is deep-rooted. He does 
not simply find its teaching unpersuasive; his words betray his profound distaste for nearly every 
aspect of it. This complete condemnation has been frequently noted by scholars.
76
 Hargis writes: 
“The True Doctrine contains no hint that Christianity was tolerable in any form, whether social, 
mythical or doctrinal; Celsus’ goal…was the elimination of Christianity altogether.”
77
 This is a 
bold estimation of Celsus’ intent, but it does not seem to be far from the truth. This chapter will 
explore the numerous examples which have led so many to recognize that Celsus would have 
happily “wished Christ away from the Roman Empire...”
78
 There are three main aspects of 
Christianity that Celsus attacks again and again: its doctrine, its God, and its followers. The 
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criticism of these essential elements of Christianity constitutes the heart of Celsus’ treatise and 
best demonstrates his wholly negative opinion of the faith. 
Looking first at Celsus’ judgment of their doctrine, he presents two main issues with it: 
one, that it is unoriginal; two, that it is absurd. Regarding Christianity’s unoriginality, Celsus 
often seeks to show that Christianity is not putting forth any new ideas by pointing out the 
similarities between their recycled ideas and popular non-Christian ones. Not only did this 
comparison suggest that Christianity was only a mere copy of a more substantive ideology, but it 
allowed Celsus to combat the arrogance of this infant faith. Christianity has claimed from its 
beginnings that its message was the only true one. Its God was the only God; its religion was for 
all men. In short, Christians believed that their religion had an exclusive claim to truth and a 
universal applicability to the lives of men. This idea of Christian exclusivism and universalism is 
described by Scarborough in his discussion of Origen’s Contra Celsum: “It is with the Christian 
faith, Origen argues, that history becomes historic for the first time. Celsus has not only misread 
the Scriptures, but even more egregiously misreads the course of human events they narrate.”
79
 
Christians believed that, without the doctrine found in the Scriptures, human existence – 
individually and in general – would not fully be understood. With this being the case, 
Christianity must necessarily be the only religion that holds true at all times for all men – 
including those men who existed before the religion started in the 1
st
 century AD. For Celsus, 
however, this was incredibly presumptuous for a religion that had existed for less than 200 years. 
As such, his efforts to demonstrate the unoriginality of the Christian faith not only showed the 
superiority of existing Graeco-Roman ideas, but it also deconstructed the Christian claims to 
universalism. 
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There are many passages in Celsus’ treatise that demonstrate this opinion about 
Christianity’s unoriginality. Two passages in particular, however, serve as paradigms for how 
Celsus makes this attack on Christianity. The first passage is a prime example of Celsus’ efforts 
to list the particular examples of those who have already put forth the ideas Christians were just 
beginning to formulate. In a discussion on the worship of Jesus, he writes: 
…παραπλήσιον ἡμᾶς οἴεται πεποιηκέναι τόν, ὥς φησιν ἡ Κέλσος, ἁλόντα καὶ 
ἀποθανόντα θρησκεύοντας τοῖς Γέταις σέβουσι τὸν Ζάμολξιν καὶ Κίλιξι τὸν 
Μόψον καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶσι τὸν Ἀμφίλοχον καὶ Θηβαίοις τὸν Ἀμφιάρεωκαὶ Λεβαδίοις 
τὸν Τροφώνιον. (3.34) 
 
I emphasize that the Christians worship a man who was arrested and died, after 
the manner of the Getae who reverence Zamolxis, or those Sicilians who worship 
Mopsus, the Aracarnanians who worship Amphilochus, or the Thebans who 




In this instance and in other places, Celsus will enumerate other people or races that share 
characteristics with Christianity. He does this when discussing many different claims of 
Christianity. He points out that there have been many other magicians (in addition to Jesus) that 
have gained influence among the common people, that a variety of races claim that their most 
ancient ancestors were born from the earth, that Christians are hardly the first to argue that their 
God and their laws are the only true ones among all that exist, and that many religions have 
prohibited idolatry.
81
 In all of these instances, Celsus names specific examples of other 
individuals or groups that put forth ideas that Christians were only beginning to teach. Hargis 
articulates well how Celsus’ method in passages like this ought to cause people to question their 
exclusivist claims: “If a doctrine or myth is similar to those belonging to other philosophies or 
religions, how can it claim to be the only valid one? Contrary to the claims of Christians about 
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their uniqueness, Christianity was just another religion.”
82
 A similarity to even one other religion 
would be effective in bringing Christianity down from its self-erected pedestal and back into the 
crowd of other religions. Celsus, however, is remarkably thorough in his efforts to put 
Christianity in its place. He not only points out many different aspects of Christianity that can be 
found in earlier cultures and religions, but he names those predecessors to the point of 
exhaustion. In this way, he is able to make it abundantly clear that Christians cannot sensibly tout 
a unique doctrine. 
Another passage demonstrates Celsus’ second strategy in exposing the unoriginality of 
Christianity. He spends much time comparing Christian belief to Platonic thought in an effort to 
show the superiority of the latter, which of course predated Christianity. For example, Celsus 
indeed thinks that Christians discuss many of the same things that Plato does in his philosophy. 
For example, he compares the Christian idea of God to the Platonic one. More specifically, he 
wonders what kind of god it is that is said to “come down” to earth as Christians believe Jesus 
did. This is completely strange to Celsus, who writes: 
Ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθός ἐστι καὶ καλὸς καὶ εὐδαίμων καὶ ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ καὶ ἀρίστῳ· εἰ δὴ 
ἐς ἀνθρώπους κάτεισι, μεταβολῆς αὐτῷ δεῖ, μεταβολῆς δὲ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ εἰς κακὸν 
καὶ ἐκ καλοῦ εἰς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἐξ εὐδαιμονίας εἰς κακοδαιμονίαν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ 
ἀρίστου εἰς τὸ πονηρότατον. Τίς ἂν οὖν ἕλοιτο τοιαύτην μεταβολήν; (4.14) 
 
God is that which is beautiful and happy and exists within himself in the most 
perfect of all conceivable states. This means that God is changeless. A god who 
comes down to men undergoes change - a change from good to bad; from 
beautiful to shameful; from happiness to misfortune; from what is perfect to what 




Celsus points out here that both Christians and Plato had ideas of a singular “God” beyond the 
various gods of Graeco-Roman mythology. However, the God of the Christians, due to his 
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purported incarnation, ultimately shows himself to be no god at all. His ability and even desire to 
change from “perfect” to “wicked” is directly against the very essence of God. As Watson 
writes: “The whole Platonic scheme of things depended on the clear distinction between the two 
worlds, the world of intellect and the world of sense, the kosmos noëtos and the kosmos 
aisthëtos. The Christian notion of God’s activity was a disastrous denial of this distinction.”
84
 In 
particular, the incarnation, in which God himself is said not only to live among humans but to 
become human himself, is the height of blasphemy against the way God actually is according to 
Platonist thought. Thus, Christians are not only copying Platonist doctrine, but totally destroying 
the essence of it. The fact that men believe in Christianity is so distasteful to Celsus because it 
wrongfully boasts of its eternal and original truth when they are only really insulting actual truth. 
 In addition to the unoriginality of Christianity, Celsus frequently seems simply 
bewildered by it. Although he is clearly familiar with what Christians teach, he sees their 
doctrine as completely absurd. This opinion is made no clearer than when he considers the 
Christian teaching of the resurrection of Jesus. As Chadwick remarks, “perhaps no doctrine was 
so peculiarly nauseating to him as the Jewish-Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the 
body.”
85
 Celsus’ discussion of the resurrection comes in the portion of his work in which he puts 
his criticisms in the mouth of a Jew. In the sections where the Jew is speaking, Celsus imagines a 
dialogue between a Jew and a Christian. The Jew essentially interrogates the Christian, asking 
him question after question so that he will explain the intricacies of Christian belief. Celsus’ 
attack against the Christian doctrine of Jesus’ resurrection comes during this interrogation, with 
the Jew first asking the following: Τίνι οὖν προσήχθητε ἢ διότι προεῖπεν, ὡς ἀποθανὼν 
ἀναστήσεται; (2.54) “Is your belief based on the ‘fact’ that this Jesus told in advance that he 
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would rise again after his death?” From this opening question, Celsus systematically attempts to 
discredit the truth of this Christian claim. He focuses primarily on the absurdity of these claims 
in order to effectively carry out this criticism. 
 Celsus first makes a comment about how the Christian resurrection story is similar to 
many other Graeco-Roman stories about resurrection. This comment echoes the explicit 
statements he makes about the unoriginality of Christian doctrine. After touching on those other 
similar stories, he turns his attention back to the Christian story itself: 
Ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο σκεπτέον, εἴ τις ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀποθανὼν ἀνέστη ποτὲ αὐτῷ σώματι· ἢ 
οἴεσθε τὰ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων μύθους εἶναί τε καὶ δοκεῖν, ὑμῖν δὲ τὴν καταστροφὴν 
τοῦ δράματος εὐσχημόνως ἢ πιθανῶς ἐφευρῆσθαι… (2.55) 
 
But quite apart from these risings from the dead, we must look carefully at the 
question of the resurrection of the body as a possibility given to mortals. 
Doubtless you will freely admit that these other stories are legends, even as they 
appear to me; but you will go on to say that your resurrection story, this climax to 
your tragedy, is believable and noble... 
 
Celsus’ main complaint in this passage is that, despite the clearly legendary character of stories 
of resurrection, Christians still believe theirs to be not only true, but “noble.” And they do this 
while at the same time denying the truth of other resurrections. But even beyond this 
contradiction, their belief in Jesus’ resurrection necessarily demonstrates their belief that 
resurrection can occur at all. As Celsus says, “we must look carefully at the question of the 
resurrection of the body as a possibility given to mortals.” The implication seems to be that it is 
foolish of Christians to focus so intently upon the resurrection of Jesus when the resurrection of 
the dead may not even be possible. This resurrection is the triumphant end of all the Gospels and 
occupies a major place in the letters of today’s New Testament (e.g. 1 Cor. 15). If the 
resurrection did not even happen in the first place, Christians are left with many inherently false 
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claims in their writings. Celsus is therefore rightly bewildered by the Christian commitment in 
beliving in the truth and nobility of an impossible event. 
 Even beyond the inherently hollow nature of their teachings on Jesus’ resurrection, 
however, Celsus clearly discounts the evidence Christians give in support of Jesus’ resurrection. 
He continues with the following, immediately following the passage just cited: 
ἢ οἴεσθε τὰ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων μύθους εἶναί τε καὶ δοκεῖν, ὑμῖν δὲ τὴν καταστροφὴν 
τοῦ δράματος εὐσχημόνως ἢ πιθανῶς ἐφευρῆσθαι, τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ σκόλοπος αὐτοῦ 
φωνήν, ὅτ' ἀπέπνει, καὶ "τὸν σεισμὸν" καὶ τὸν σκότον; Ὅτι δὴ ζῶν μὲν οὐκ 
ἐπήρκεσεν ἑαυτῷ, νεκρὸς δ' ἀνέστη καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῆς κολάσεως ἔδειξε καὶ τὰς 
χεῖρας ὡς ἦσαν πεπερονημέναι, τίς τοῦτο εἶδε; Γυνὴ πάροιστρος, ὥς φατε, καὶ εἴ 
τις ἄλλος τῶν ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς γοητείας, ἤτοι κατά τινα διάθεσιν ὀνειρώξας καὶ κατὰ 
τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν δόξῃ πεπλανημένῃ φαντασιωθείς, ὅπερ ἤδη μυρίοις συμβέ 
βηκεν, ἤ, ὅπερ μᾶλλον, ἐκπλῆξαι τοὺς λοιποὺς τῇ τερατείᾳ ταύτῃ θελήσας καὶ διὰ 
τοῦ τοιούτου ψεύσματος ἀφορμὴν ἄλλοις ἀγύρταις παρασχεῖν. (2.55) 
 
Doubtless you will freely admit that these other stories are legends, even as they 
appear to me; but you will go on to say that your resurrection story, this climax to 
your tragedy, is believable and noble. (This is of course, notwithstanding his cry 
from the cross). I suppose you say that the earthquake and the darkness that 
covered the earth at the time of his death prove him to be a god, and that even 
though he did not accept the challenge to remove himself from the cross or to 
escape his persecutors when he was alive, yet he overcame them all by rising 
from the dead and showing the marks of his punishment, pierced hands and all, to 
others. But who really saw this? A hysterical woman, as you admit and perhaps 
one other person - both deluded by his sorcery, or else so wrenched with grief at 
his failure that they hallucinated him risen from the dead by a sort of wishful 
thinking. This mistaking a fantasy for reality is not at all uncommon; indeed, it 
has happened to thousands. Just as possible, these deluded women wanted to 
impress the others - who had already the good sense to have abandoned him - by 
spreading their hallucinations about as “visions.” 
 
Celsus does not give any consideration to the evidence Christians bring forth about Jesus’ 
resurrection. After mentioning two different pieces of evidence in a dismissive tone, the darkness 
and Jesus’ appearing to his followers, he immediately sets out to undercut the second part. He 
paints a picture of the “hysterical” women that Jesus appeared to and accuses them of spreading 
this delusion among others. When comparing Celsus’ presentation of the events after Jesus’ 
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death to what the Bible records, it is hard not to see his version as a caricature of what Christians 
actually believed. As the gospels record it, the women that were among Jesus’ followers went to 
his tomb in order to anoint his body for burial (Matthew 28:1-10, Mark 16:1-8). Upon their 
arrival, however, an angel appeared to them and told them of Jesus’ resurrection. This encounter 
with the angel, as Matthew writes, caused the women to fear and rush back to the disciples. The 
gospel account, then, does not portray the women as hysterical or unduly emotional. They were 
simply mourning their dead teacher and were frightened after an unexpected visit from the angel. 
However, Celsus’ version of these women presents them as totally out of their minds with grief 
or due to Jesus’ sorcery. In his version of the story, the women are untrustworthy messengers, 
running around under some delusion and wickedly trying to convince others that what they had 
seen was true. By presenting the scene after Jesus’ resurrection as one of hysteria and chaos, 
Celsus seems to be attempting to draw out the inherently absurd nature of this Christian belief. 
The implied question seems to be this: How could anyone believe that Jesus actually rose from 
the dead and appeared to his followers when it is far more likely that these women were simply 
deluded by their grief? In short, there were much more likely explanations for this event and it 
would be foolish to believe the Biblical account of an actual bodily resurrection and an actual 
appearance from an angel. 
 Celsus, however, is not finished in his criticism of the Christian resurrection story. He 
goes on to point out the absurdity of Jesus’ own supposed actions after he rose from the dead. He 
writes much about this, but his criticism is best shown by the following statements: ὅτε μὲν 
ἠπιστεῖτο ὢν ἐν σώματι, πᾶσιν ἀνέδην ἐκήρυττεν· ὅτε δὲ πίστιν ἂν ἰσχυρὰν παρεῖχεν ἐκ νεκρῶν 
ἀναστάς, ἑνὶ μόνῳ γυναίῳ καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ θιασώταις κρύβδην παρεφαίνετο (2.70). “When he 
was in the body, he was disbelieved but preached to everyone; after his resurrection, apparently 
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wanting to establish a strong faith, he chooses to show himself to one woman and a few 
comrades only.” Celsus cannot understand why Jesus was said to be so secretive when he rose 
from the dead. As the gospels record, Jesus only appeared to his own followers before ascending 
into heaven. Celsus wonders why he did not appear to more people, such as those who actually 
killed him, in order to prove that he had truly been raised from the dead. Indeed, as he says in the 
passage just quoted, Jesus’ actions were simply backwards. Before his death, he persisted in 
preaching to countless people in a multitude of places, although he was largely disbelieved by 
those people. Then, after he was publicly killed, he did not bother to show himself alive to such a 
great amount of people. In other words, when he would have surely been believed, having clearly 
risen from the dead, he is secretive and quiet. In Celsus’ eyes, there is no logic to Jesus’ actions. 
 Throughout all of these passages, Celsus highlights the absurdity of the Christian doctrine 
of the resurrection. Not only do Christians believe this particular resurrection while discounting 
all others, their evidence for it is empty and their claims about Jesus’ own actions are illogical. 
This estimation of Christian doctrine is consistent throughout Celsus’ work, no matter what 
particular aspect he is focusing on. But, it is especially notable that he thinks so little of the 
Christian belief in Jesus’ resurrection due to the central place this holds in Christian doctrine. 
The life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, as discussed before, make up the heart of the gospel 
stories and are written about extensively in Paul’s letters. Thus, if Celsus dismisses the 
resurrection of Jesus so easily, then it is no surprise that other, less central elements of 
Christianity are just as distasteful to him. 
In addition to Celsus’ criticisms concerning the doctrine of Christians, he also has quite a 
low opinion of the Christian God. Just as with their doctrine, Celsus has a multi-faceted criticism 
of their God. More specifically, Celsus sees this God as not only evil, but highly incompetent 
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and weak. Freeman points out both sides of Celsus’ low view of God, first discussing God’s 
seemingly evil nature:  
One of Celsus’ major concerns is that Jesus is the messenger of a malevolent god. 
God had already shown that he can be destructive of his creation – Celsus cites 
the tower of Babel and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. Now Jesus 
brings the message that the majority of humankind will suffer eternal punishment 




Freeman later goes on to cite instances where Celsus questions the power of a God who cannot 
even protect his own people when they are persecuted and who is in a seemingly never-ending 
struggle with the devil.
87
 This two-sided understanding of God – that he is overall incompetent, 
but performs what actions he can in an evil manner – underlies all that Celsus says about the 
Christian God.  
Numerous examples can be found to demonstrate Celsus’ opinion, but one passage in 
particular serves as a prime example of that opinion. Writing about the Christian refusal to 
worship the images of gods, he alludes to Christians who actually smash the images of Graeco-
Roman gods in service to their own God. However, he goes on to point out this foolishness of 
serving their particular god, writing: 
Οὐχ ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, ὅτι καὶ τὸν σὸν δαίμονα καταστάς τις οὐ 
βλασφημεῖ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσης γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης ἐκκηρύττει καὶ σὲ τὸν καθω 
σιωμένον ὥσπερ ἄγαλμα αὐτῷ δήσας ἀπάγει καὶ ἀνασκολο πίζει· καὶ ὁ δαίμων ἤ, 
ὡς σὺ φῄς, ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ παῖς οὐδὲν αὐτὸν ἀμύνεται; 
τὸν δὲ σὸν θεὸν παρόντα κατατείνοντες καὶ κολάζοντες οὐδὲν οἱ ταῦτα 
δράσαντες πεπόνθασιν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐν τοσούτῳ βίῳ. Τί καινὸν ἐξ 
ἐκείνου γέγονεν ᾧ πιστεύσαι ἄν τις ὡς οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος ἄνθρωπος γόης ἀλλὰ θεοῦ 
παῖς; Καὶ ὁ πέμψας ἄρα τὸν υἱὸν ἀγγελμάτων τινῶν εἵνεκα οὕτως ὠμῶς 
κολασθέντα, ὡς συνδιαφθείρεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἀγγέλματα, περιεῖδε καὶ τοσούτου 
χρόνου διελθόντος οὐκ ἐπεστράφη. Τίς οὕτως ἀνόσιος πατήρ; (8.39,41) 
 
Does this good Christian fellow not see that I might do the same without fear of 
reprisal to an image of his god? You are banished from land and sea, bound and 
                                                 
86
 Freeman 2009:173 
87
 Freeman 2009:174 
40 
 
punished for your devotion to [God] and taken away to be crucified. Where then 
is your God’s vengeance on his persecutors? 
I would call your attention to the fact that the men who tortured your god 
in person suffered nothing in return; not then, nor as long as they lived. And what 
new developments have taken place since your story proved false - something that 
would encourage someone to think that this man was not a sorcerer but the son of 
God? What are we to think of a god so negligent that he not only permitted his 
son to suffer as cruel a death as this Jesus did, but who allowed the message he 
was sent to deliver to perish with him? A long time has passed since then, and 
nothing has changed. Is there any human father so ruthless as your god? 
 
In the first part of this passage, Celsus points out that the Christian God is not doing what 
Christians claim he can. That is, they are willing to die for a God who they claim is all-powerful, 
but yet this God does not save them from death in response to this devotion. Celsus initially does 
not provide any explanation for why God does not save them, but simply points out that he is not 
there for his people. As he continues, however, he starts to provide possible reasons why their 
God is silent. The first reason he implies is that God is too incompetent to carry out his plans all 
the way. He calls God “negligent” for “allowing the message [Jesus] was sent to deliver to perish 
with him.” Because of his negligence, Celsus writes that God simply allows evil to happen to his 
people. This idea of negligence seems to imply that the Christian God does not merely allow evil 
to come upon people, but that he is unable to prevent evil from happening. Instead of actively 
protecting Christians from the persecution they face, his attention is elsewhere. In short, he is 
incompetent because he is negligent. This passivity and weakness thus provides one possible 
reason for why God has not stepped in to spread the message of Christianity and to ensure the 
safety of its followers. 
 The second reason that Celsus offers is much more prominent in this section and his work 
as a whole: that God does not protect his people because he is evil. Celsus alludes to the fact that 
God allowed Jesus to die a cruel death. But, even beyond the cruelty of his death, it was 
senseless for multiple reasons: those who killed Jesus have suffered no punishment in turn, 
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Jesus’ message “perished with him,” and “nothing has changed.” This last reason is vague, but 
Celsus probably is implying that the followers of Jesus are suffering crucifixion and other 
horrible deaths just as he did. In this way, nothing at all has changed for those preaching the 
Christian message. Celsus ends this line of attack by calling God a “ruthless father.” This 
description is extremely powerful and telling. Comparing God to human fathers only serves to 
emphasize the cruelty of God even more. “Ruthless” is not at all the description that a father 
ought to earn for themselves and was far from the concept of fatherhood that can be found in 
other Roman literature.  
One prime example of this is in Livy’s description of Romulus in Ab Urbe Condita. After 
founding Rome and building up the power of the infant city, Romulus is taken up by the gods 
and given a place among them. Livy’s account is as follows: 
subito coorta tempestas cum magno fragore tonitribusque tam denso regem 
operuit nimbo ut conspectum eius contioni abstulerit; nec deinde in terris 
Romulus fuit.…deinde a paucis initio facto, deum deo natum, regem parentemque 
urbis Romanae saluere uniuersi Romulum iubent; pacem precibus exposcunt, uti 
uolens propitius suam semper sospitet progeniem (Ab Urbe Condita 1.16.1,3) 
 
Suddenly a storm rose up with a great crash and with thunder and covered the 
king with a cloud so dense that it hid his view from the assembly; no longer was 
Romulus on the earth…Then, with the deed having begun by a few, all the men 
entreated that Romulus be hailed a god, born from a god, king, and parent of the 
Roman city; they requested peace with their prayers, so that, being graciously 




Livy portrays Romulus as a great leader, notable for his piety, his success in war, and his 
willingness to pursue peace instead of war if possible.
89
 He is held up as an exemplum in Livy’s 
work and, as Stem points out, Romulus’ character “represents the origins of the Roman national 
character, and so his characterization has tremendous significance for Livy’s depiction of the 
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greatness that national character came to achieve.”
90
 In short, Romulus was loved by his 
contemporaries and was a paradigm of a great Roman even when Livy wrote in the late 




 As Livy records, the assembly of Romans who watched Romulus disappear in a cloud 
eventually call him not only a god and king, but a parent. With this title of parent, they entreat 
Romulus to protect the Roman people who are his progeniem, his offspring. There are two 
important lessons here about Roman expectation of their fathers. Firstly, by connecting the idea 
of parenthood to the great character and deeds of Romulus shows that only this impressive 
resume alone deserved the title of “parent.” Secondly, the fact that the Roman people sought 
Romulus’ help on the basis of their standing as his offspring indicates that they expected parents 
to be gracious to their children. This same expectation can be seen explicitly in the imperial 
period as well. Peppard writes that “Augustus and his successors established the emperor's role 
as father of the Empire, the paterfamilias of a large family. Roman authors regarded the image as 
befitting Augustan stability, and they hoped it would portend continued imperial clementia.”
92
 
Augustus and other emperors, like Romulus, were father figures whose clementia, “compassion,” 
was hoped for on the basis of their role as fathers. 
Therefore, the picture of Roman fatherhood, seen through Romulus and historical 
evidence of the honors given to the Roman emperors, is strikingly different from the description 
that Celsus gives of the Christian God. Unlike Romulus, God’s incompetence prevents him from 
being great. Moreover, God did not help his offspring – his own son and Christians themselves – 
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but instead allows them to suffer persecution and even death. God’s inability and seeming 
unwillingness to protect his people is extremely significant in light of the tension between 
Christians and the Roman Empire. As discussed in the introduction, Christians were openly 
ranking their allegiance to the emperor lower than their allegiance to their God. For Celsus, 
however, this shift in loyalty was incomprehensible. Indeed, it was a shift from something 
beneficial to something harmful; from a benevolent father to a “ruthless” one. It is true that not 
every emperor lived up to the ideal of Romulus or Augustus. However, putting one’s hope in the 
emperor was at least founded in the possibility that such great men could lead and have 
compassion on their people. With the Christian God, however, any hope placed in him was 
completely unfounded. He had showed no benevolence towards his own son and was continuing 
his cruelty towards Christian followers. In this way, Celsus is implying that the emperor was in 
fact superior to the Christian God. This is an impactful critique on Christianity, which teaches 
the superiority of God over any mortal ruler, and on Christians themselves, who were 
abandoning traditional worship of the emperor for that God. Thus, Celsus’ comment about the 
the ruthlessness of God at the end of this passage is a serious condemnation of the nature of that 
God. 
Celsus’ other comments about the Christian God focus on the idea of his weakness and 
incompetence. In a section in which he discusses Jesus’ actions on earth, he takes Christians on 
their own terms and allows their belief that Jesus himself was God. Thus, his comments in this 
passage reveal even more about his opinion of the Christian God. He writes: 
 
Πῶς δ' ἐμέλλομεν τοῦτον νομίζειν θεόν, ὃς τά τε ἄλλα, ὥσπερ ἐπηκούετο, οὐδὲν 
ὧν ἐπηγγέλλετο ἐπεδείκνυτο, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐλέγξαντες αὐτὸν καὶ καταγνόντες 
ἠξιοῦμεν κολάζεσθαι, κρυπτόμενος μὲν καὶ διαδιδράσκων ἐπονειδιστότατα ἑάλω, 
ὑπ' αὐτῶν δὲ ὧν ὠνόμαζε μαθητῶν προὐδόθη; Καίτοι θεόν, φησίν, ὄντα οὔτε 
φεύγειν ἐνῆν οὔτε δεθέντα ἀπάγεσθαι, ἥκιστα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων αὐτῷ καὶ 
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παντὸς ἰδίᾳ κεκοι νωνηκότων καὶ διδασκάλῳ χρωμένων σωτῆρα νομιζόμενον καὶ 
θεοῦ τοῦ μεγίστου παῖδα καὶ ἄγγελον ἐγκαταλείπεσθαί τε καὶ ἐκδίδοσθαι. (2.9) 
 
How can you regard him as a god when as a matter of fact he was not eager to 
make public anything he professed to do? After he had been tried and condemned 
and it had been decided that he should be punished, where did we find him? 
Hiding – trying to escape. And was he not even betrayed by those whom he was 
silly enough to call disciples? If he was a god, is it likely that he would have run 
away? Would he have permitted himself to be arrested? Most of all: Would a god 
– a savior, as you say, and son of the Most High God – be betrayed by the very 
men who had been taught by him and shared everything with him? 
 
Celsus cites many different things that show Jesus’ weakness: his efforts to hide from his 
punishment, his ultimate capitulation to the authorities, and his inability to persuade his 
followers to remain loyal to him in his death. These three aspects of the Christian God’s 
weakness seem contradictory at first glance. How could Jesus be condemned for both hiding and 
allowing himself to be arrested? If he had gone into hiding, how was he then arrested? 
Presumably, Celsus is referring to the time Jesus spent praying in the Garden of Gethsemane 
before being arrested (Matthew 26:36-46).
93
 This time of private prayer with only his disciples as 
company could be interpreted as “hiding.” Then, having been unsuccessful in this attempt to hide 
since Judas – his disciple and betrayer – knew his location, he allowed himself to be arrested. 
Thus, Jesus can truly be said to be weak in all of these ways. In short, the entire story of his death 
demonstrates his utter incompetence. He was not persuasive enough to keep his men loyal to 
him, he could not hide adequately enough, and he surrendered immediately to the Romans. A 
true god would never have been in danger of death in the first place and, if he was, would not be 
so hapless in the face of it. In this way, Celsus shows clearly his opinion that the Christian God 
was a highly inadequate excuse for a god.  
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Just as with his opinion on Christian doctrine, Celsus complains about nearly every 
aspect of the Christian idea of God. This god is inherently evil and unable to do all those great 
things that Christians claim he can do. And, just as his opinion about the absurdity of Jesus’ 
resurrection – the heart of Christianity – shows his disregard for Christian doctrine as a whole, 
his particular emphasis on God’s evil nature and incompetence hits on the foundation of what 
most Christians believed about God at this time and the understanding of God that prevails 
today.
94
 If God is not the loving father who has the power to create the entire world and affect 
the events in that world, then what are Christians left with? Only a ruthless being just as subject 
to the powers of evil as humans are. This is hardly a god worthy of praise and Celsus’ arguments 
lead clearly to this conclusion. 
Finally, Celsus’ last major criticism concerns their followers. As with all of his criticism, 
his comments about Christians themselves are varied but exhibit the same disdain for the group. 
Primarily, Celsus focuses on the Christians’ lack of heritage, their ignorance, and the evil they 
spread throughout society. His mentions of their ignorance and stupidity do sometimes constitute 
their own arguments, but often they are reserved for side comments as he focuses on other 
distasteful parts of Christianity. For example, in the midst of a discussion on Jesus, Celsus 
writes: “Taking its root in the lower classes, the religion continues to spread among the vulgar: 
nay, one can even say it spread because of its vulgarity and the illiteracy of its adherents” (1.27). 
In these comments, one can hear echoes of earlier polemics against Christians. Before his 
systematic and philosophical treatment of the religion, most literature concerning the Christians 
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focused on rumors and first-hand observations. Despite this change, Celsus often makes 
comments like the one just cited, which essentially amount to insults containing half-truths. That 
is, he does not go on to prove that Christianity “spread because of its vulgarity and the illiteracy 
of its adherents,” but that does not stop him from using this insult to attack the religion. Indeed, 
Hargis’ description of pre-Celsus polemics can rightly be used to characterize these statements 
from Celsus himself:  
Although the general population undoubtedly knew some basic truths about 
Christians – that they refused to worship other gods, for example, or that their 
religion originated with a Jew named Jesus – pagan reaction was dominated by 
the belief that Christians were involved in bizarre and immoral behavior. There 




Hargis views all of the anti-Christian polemic as an effort to show how Christianity was separate 
from, and thus inferior to, Graeco-Roman culture and ideas.
96
 While Celsus is generally 
sophisticated in his attempt to set Christianity apart from the superior Graeco-Roman beliefs he 
held, there are still instances in which he resorts to ad hominem attacks of Christian people in 
order to make his points. 
 Celsus’ more well-rounded opinions of Christians are found elsewhere, as he complains 
about the Christian efforts to spread their message among people in the lower class of society. 
He writes:  
Ἀλλ' ὁρῶμεν δή που καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀγοραῖς τὰ ἐπιρρητότατα ἐπιδεικνυμένους 
καὶ ἀγείροντας εἰς μὲν φρονίμων ἀνδρῶν σύλλογον οὐκ ἄν ποτε παρελθόντας οὐδ' 
ἐν τούτοις τὰ ἑαυτῶν καλὰ τολμήσαντας ἐπιδεικνύειν, ἔνθα δ' ἂν ὁρῶσι μειράκια 
καὶ οἰκοτρίβων ὄχλον καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων ὅμιλον, ἐνταῦθα ὠθουμένους τε 
καὶ καλλωπιζομένους. (3.50) 
 
They would not dare to enter into conversation with intelligent men, or to voice 
their sophisticated beliefs in the presence of the wise. On the other hand, 
wherever one finds a crowd of adolescent boys, or a bunch of slaves, or a 
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company of fools, there will the Christian teachers be also - showing off their fine 
new philosophy. 
 
Celsus’ tone here is highly sarcastic, mocking the “fine new philosophy” of the Christians and 
caricaturing Christian teachers as overzealous and unsophisticated. Moreover, Celsus paints a 
picture of Christians as strategic in their efforts to spread their message. It’s almost as if he 
believes they have nefarious motives in reaching the people that they do. He goes on, writing: 
σφᾶς δὲ μόνους ὅπως δεῖ ζῆν ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἂν αὐτοῖς οἱ παῖδες πείθωνται, 
μακαρίους αὐτοὺς ἔσεσθαι καὶ τὸν οἶκον ἀποφανεῖν εὐδαί μονα· καὶ ἅμα λέγοντες 
ἐὰν ἴδωσί τινα παριόντα τῶν παιδείας διδασκάλων καὶ φρονιμωτέρων ἢ καὶ αὐτὸν 
τὸν πατέρα, οἱ μὲν εὐλαβέστεροι αὐτῶν διέτρεσαν, οἱ δ' ἰταμώ τεροι τοὺς παῖδας 
ἀφηνιάζειν ἐπαίρουσι, τοιαῦτα ψιθυρί ζοντες, ὡς παρόντος μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ 
τῶν διδασκάλων οὐδὲν αὐτοὶ ἐθελήσουσιν οὐδὲ δυνήσονται τοῖς παισὶν 
ἑρμηνεύειν ἀγαθόν, ἐκτρέπεσθαι γὰρ τὴν ἐκείνων ἀβελτηρίαν καὶ σκαιότητα, 
πάντῃ διεφθαρμένων καὶ πόρρω κακίας ἡκόντων καὶ σφᾶς κολαζόντων· εἰ δὲ 
θέλοιεν, χρῆναι αὐτοὺς ἀφεμένους τοῦ πατρός τε καὶ τῶν διδασκάλων ἰέναι σὺν 
τοῖς γυναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμπαίζουσι παιδαρίοις εἰς τὴν γυναικωνῖτιν ἢ τὸ σκυτεῖον 
ἢ τὸ κναφεῖον, ἵνα τὸ τέλειον λάβωσι· καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντες πείθουσιν. (3.55) 
 
These Christians claim that they alone know the right way to live, and that if only 
the children will believe them, they will be happy and their homes will be happy 
as well. Now if, as they are speaking thus to the children, they happen to see a 
schoolteacher coming along, some intelligent person, or even the father of one of 
the children, these Christians flee in all directions, or at least the more cautious of 
them. The more reckless encourage the children to rebel. These Christians also 
tell the children that they should leave their fathers and teachers and follow the 
women and their little chums to the wooldresser’s shop, or to the cobbler’s or to 
the washerwoman’s shop, so that they might learn how to be perfect. And by this 
logic they have persuaded many to join them. 
 
This passage fills out Celsus’ view of Christians in an important way. Not only do Christians 
hang around the dregs of society and spread their message among them, which he finds bad 
enough in itself, but they also actively encourage others to abandon the teachings of their fathers. 
As Hargis notes, this proselytizing was “a serious breach of social norms.” He continues: “Just as 
Christians were rebels from approved religions, from governmental authority, and from 





 The activity of Christians therefore had the serious consequence of upsetting the 
acceptable social structures. They were evangelizing primarily by seeking out the weaker 
members of society – women, children, and slaves – which was tantamount to 
“undermining…pagan homes in order to make converts.”
98
 It would have been contemptible 
enough if Christians converted Roman men, who in turn brought their new faith to their families. 
In that scenario, the social norms of Roman society would have at least been retained.
99
 Instead, 
Christians were usurping the authority of a father to convert their wives, children, and slaves, 
upsetting the common religion and societal structure in one act.  
In addition to proselytizing itself, Christians only sought to make converts because they 
believed their doctrine was the only true one. As already discussed in this chapter, that claim is 
laughable to Celsus, making it even more frustrating that they spread it throughout society trying 
to convert people to the Christian faith. Taking these passages together, Celsus’ primary issue 
with Christians is not simply that they are unintelligent and believe false doctrine. Rather, it is 
that they insist on trying to persuade others to believe this doctrine and only target the basest of 
society because they know how hollow their teaching actually is. Their very existence is 
troublesome, but their evangelizing only spreads this trouble throughout society. 
 A related complaint that Celsus makes is that the main goal of Christian evangelism is to 
bring sinners into the faith. This is so bothersome for Celsus because this is exactly the opposite 
goal from most other religions. He writes: 
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Οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας τελετὰς καλοῦντες προκηρύττουσι τάδε· ὅστις χεῖρας 
καθαρὸς καὶ φωνὴν συνετός, καὶ αὖθις ἕτεροι· ὅστις ἁγνὸς ἀπὸ παντὸς μύσους, 
καὶ ὅτῳ ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδὲν σύνοιδε κακόν, καὶ ὅτῳ εὖ καὶ δικαίως βεβίωται. Καὶ 
ταῦτα προκηρύττουσιν οἱ καθάρσια ἁμαρτημάτων ὑπισχνού μενοι. Ἐπακούσωμεν 
δὲ τίνας ποτὲ οὗτοι καλοῦσιν· ὅστις, φασίν, ἁμαρτωλός, ὅστις ἀσύνετος, ὅστις 
νήπιος, καὶ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ὅστις κακοδαίμων, τοῦτον ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ 
δέξεται. Τὸν ἁμαρτωλὸν ἆρα οὐ τοῦτον λέγετε, τὸν ἄδικον καὶ κλέπτην καὶ 
τοιχωρύχον καὶ φαρμακέα καὶ ἱερόσυλον καὶ τυμβωρύχον; Τίνας ἂν ἄλλους 
προκηρύττων λῃστὴς ἐκάλεσε; (3.59) 
 
I think anyone may see that the summons to join the other mysteries is rather 
different, however. It runs: Come forward, whoever has a pure heart and a wise 
tongue, or else, whoever is free of sin and whose soul is pure - you who are 
righteous and good - come forward. In the mystery religions, such talk is typical, 
as is the promise that membership brings about a sort of purification from sins. 
But the call to membership in the cult of Christ is this: Whoever is a sinner, 
whoever is unwise, whoever is childish - yea, whoever is a wretch - his is the 
kingdom of God. And so they invite into membership those who by their own 
account are sinners: the dishonest, thieves, burglars, poisoners, blasphemers of all 
descriptions, grave robbers. I mean - what other cult actually invites robbers to 
become members! 
 
This argument falls right in line with his disdain for how Christians constantly hang around the 
lowest classes of society. It’s not simply that Christians are unintelligent and insistent on 
spreading their false message throughout society. Celsus also complains of the bad character of 
Christians. Indeed, all that he says about Christians can be traced back to this fundamental 
problem with them. How could one expect unrighteous men not to engage in such disreputable 
activities as the Christians did? Their doctrine can only attract bad men, and it is no surprise that 
their activities are just as corrupt and troublesome. 
 Another major argument that Celsus makes against the Christians is that they are 
disruptive and dangerous to the very structure of society. There are two major aspects to his 
complaint: one, that they had no connection to ancient tradition; and two, that their attitude 
towards human government makes it impossible for any state at all to stand. Celsus demonstrates 
the Christians’ lack of tradition by comparing them to the Jewish people. He writes: 
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Ἰουδαῖοι μὲν οὖν ἔθνος ἴδιον γενόμενοι καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐπιχώριον νόμους θέμενοι καὶ 
τούτους ἐν σφίσιν ἔτι νῦν περιστέλλοντες καὶ θρησκείαν ὁποίαν δή, πάτριον δ' 
οὖν, φυλάσσοντες ὅμοια τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις δρῶσιν, ὅτι ἕκαστοι τὰ πάτρια, 
ὁποῖά ποτ' ἂν τύχῃ καθεστηκότα, περιέπουσι. ∆οκεῖ δ' οὕτως καὶ συμφέρειν, οὐ 
μόνον καθότι ἐπὶ νοῦν ἦλθεν ἄλλοις ἄλλως νομίσαι καὶ δεῖ φυλάττειν τὰ ἐς 
κοινὸν κεκυρωμένα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ὡς εἰκὸς τὰ μέρη τῆς γῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλα ἄλλοις 
ἐπόπταις νενεμημένα καὶ κατά τινας ἐπικρατείας διειλημμένα ταύτῃ καὶ 
διοικεῖται. Καὶ δὴ τὰ παρ' ἑκάστοις ὀρθῶς ἂν πράττοιτο ταύτῃ δρώμενα, ὅπῃ 
ἐκείνοις φίλον· παραλύειν δὲ οὐχ ὅσιον εἶναι τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τόπους 
νενομισμένα. (5.25) 
 
Now, as to the Jews: they became an individual nation and made laws according 
to the custom of their people. They still maintain these laws among themselves to 
the present day and observe certain rites and practices which, though peculiar, 
have a grounding in ancient tradition. They are, in this regard anyway, no 
different from the rest of mankind: each nation follows its customs and laws, 
whatever they happen to be. This situation seems to have come to pass not only 
because certain people decided to think in a certain way and then went about 
devising ways to protect their social conventions, but also because from the 
beginning of the world different parts of the earth were allotted to different 
guardians, and, its having been apportioned in this manner, things are done in 
such a way as pleases the guardians. For this reason it is impious to abandon the 
customs which have existed in each locality from the beginning. 
 
Both the Jews and the Christians have “peculiar” practices in Celsus’ eyes. He says so explicitly 
of the Jews here and his comments about the Christians were observed above. Despite this, 
Celsus makes clear in this passage that strange practices do not necessarily cause a group to be 
dangerous. He could very well have despised the Jewish practices as much as the Christian ones, 
but in this passage the Jews are looked on much more favorably because they are not 
disconnected from tradition. Their practices are “grounded in ancient tradition” and they can 
rightly be called a “nation” with its own customs. Moreover, the Jewish people, being located in 
a specific part of the world, were appointed “guardians” to whom they show devotion. They are 
not only people with consistent character and traditions, but with an actual physical origin. In 
contrast, the Christians have none of these things. At the time of Celsus’ treatise, Christianity 
would have only been in existence for 150 years or so. And while that stretch of time gave them 
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an opportunity to generate customs, the Jewish and Roman people had been in existence far 
longer than 150 years. Even more, in that time, Christianity had already split into numerous 
different sects, a fact which Celsus does not hesitate to criticize.
100
 And finally, Christians could 
not point to a central place of origin, with followers scattered throughout the Roman world. 
 It is quite significant that Celsus criticizes Christians’ disconnectedness from ancient 
tradition by comparing them to the Jewish people. As will be discussed next, he also criticizes 
Christians for their rebellion against the Jews and their subsequent disruption of Roman society. 
However, it could be argued that these rebellious activities of the Christians made them just like 
the Jews. By the time Celsus was writing, there had already been two major Jewish rebellions 
that had to be suppressed by the Roman Empire. The first, occurring in 66-72 AD, resulted in the 
destruction of Jerusalem, while the second, in 132-135 AD, ended with bloody massacres of the 
Jewish rebels.
101
 The fact that Celsus, despite this similarity, still commends the Jewish people 
shows how significant it was that Christians did not have a long heritage. Even a people who had 
rebelled against governmental authority could find some redemption if they were, in fact, an 
established people, like the Jews. In other words, being grounded in tradition afforded a people 
group some forgiveness for other flaws. Christians, however, could not find any redemption. 
They were both without a tradition and rebellious. As Celsus goes on, he expands on the 
disruptive activities of the Christians. But, it is important to see that his complaint about their 
rebellion could just as easily be applied to the Jewish people if it were not for this first passage. 
That is, Celsus’ further comments about Christianity’s rebellious nature only add more 
condemnation to an already damning criticism about Christianity’s lack of tradition. 
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 Celsus next argues that Christians have no tradition in part because they rebelled against 
the Jewish people, forsaking any ties they had to an established religion. Celsus writes the 
following after the passage just cited: 
ἐρήσομαι δὲ αὐτούς, πόθεν ἥκουσιν ἢ τίνα ἔχουσιν ἀρχηγέτην πατρίων νόμων. 
Οὐδένα φήσουσιν, οἵ γε ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ὥρμηνται καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὸν διδάσκαλόν τε 
καὶ χοροστάτην οὐκ ἄλλοθέν ποθεν φέρουσιν· ὅμως δ' ἀφεστήκασιν Ἰουδαίων. 
(5.33) 
 
I ask them where they came from, or who is the author of their traditional laws. 
“Nobody,” they say, though it is the case that they originated from the Jews. Nor 
can they name any other source for their teacher and chorus-leader. Yet are they 
Jews? No - they rebelled against the Jews. 
 
Celsus clearly recognized that Christians could claim some grounding in the Jewish tradition. 
However, he cites two reasons why this was no longer possible for them. One, in his experience, 
Christians did not even connect themselves to the Jewish people. Even when trying to articulate 
their origins, they did not claim Jewish descent. And two, Christians “rebelled” against the Jews. 
While Celsus does not specifically explain what he means by “rebelled,” some assumptions can 
be drawn based on the familiarity with Christianity that he displays in his treatise. Although he 
has some wild ideas about the nature of Christian gatherings, it is clear that he knows enough 
about those practices - and about Christian doctrine - to have a reasoned opinion about them. 
Because of this, it can be assumed that Celsus knew that Jesus, the central Christian figure, had 
risen up among the Jews and yet had multiple conflicts with them throughout his life. It can also 
be assumed that Celsus understood that the followers of Jesus had imitated his example and 
upheld his differences of opinion with the Jews. Even if these assumptions are incorrect, the fact 
remains that Celsus understood the Christians as breaking away from the Jewish people. For a 




For all of these reasons, Celsus has a much better estimation of the Jewish people than 
the Christians. He even goes so far as to imply that the Christians were an “impious” people. He 
says that “it is impious to abandon the customs which have existed in each locality from the 
beginning” (5.25). If it is a wicked thing to abandon ancient customs, as the Christians did with 
the Jews, how much more is it to then proceed to actively disrupt the customs of other people 
like the Romans, with whom Christians had no connection? He writes elsewhere that Christians, 
speaking to the Roman youth, “say that their elders and teachers are fools, and are in reality very 
bad men who like to voice their silly opinions” (3.55). Celsus in this same passage complains 
that Christians, as they work as simple “workers, cobblers, [and] laundry workers” make rounds 
throughout the city and in “private houses” trying to persuade young men to abandon the 
traditions they had always known (3.55). In this way, they are not only without their own 
customs but they also actively encourage others to live in the same way. Indeed, the Christians 
already rebelled against the Jews; why would they not continue to sow dissent among the 
Romans? 
In addition to this more abstract argument about the danger of Christianity, Celsus 
explicitly criticizes the danger that they pose later in his treatise. He writes: 
οὐ χρὴ ἀπιστεῖν ἀνδρὶ ἀρχαίῳ, πάλαι προειπόντι τό· Εἷς βασιλεύς, ᾧ ἔδωκε 
Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεω. Καὶ ἐπιφέρει· Ὡς, ἂν τοῦτο λύσῃς τὸ δόγμα, εἰκότως 
ἀμυνεῖταί σε ὁ βασιλεύς. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ αὐτό σοι ποιήσειαν ἅπαντες, οὐδὲν κωλύσει 
τὸν μὲν καταλειφθῆναι μόνον καὶ ἔρημον, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνομωτάτοις τε 
καὶ ἀγριω τάτοις βαρβάροις γενέσθαι, καὶ μήτε τῆς σῆς θρησκείας μήτε τῆς 
ἀληθινῆς σοφίας ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἔτι καταλείπεσθαι κλέος. (8.68) 
 
It is not wise to disbelieve the ancient sage who said ‘Let there be one king: one 
to whom the crafty Kronos gave the power.’ Overturn this axiom and you will 
know how swiftly punishment can be dealt! If everyone were to adopt the 
Christian’s attitude, moreover, there would be no rule of law: the legitimate 
authority would be abandoned; earthly things would return to chaos and come into 
the hands of the lawless and savage barbarians; and nothing further would be 




It was not only the actions of the Christians in breaking away from the Jews and causing dissent 
among the Roman people, but their very doctrine on human government that vexed Celsus. 
Baciu describes this doctrine of Christianity well, writing: “Being against the premise of making 
the sovereign a god, the Christians did not hesitate to remind that the emperor is a common 
person whose power is given by God and whose life has a final end.”
102
 Unlike the common 
inhabitant of the Roman Empire, for whom the emperor, as their highest mortal authority, 
worked in tandem with divine authority to ensure the prosperity of the Empire, Christians 
subjugated the emperor to the sovereignty of God. As such, any conflict between Roman rule 
and the commandments of God led Christians to forsake their human government for the divine. 
Celsus, as evidenced in the passage above, perceived this as a slippery slope: “If everyone were 
to adopt the Christian’s attitude, moreover, there would be no rule of law…” To adhere to the 
rule of an invisible God was tantamount to complete lawlessness, for any breach of human law 
could be justified by reference to that God. Even more, this lawlessness would destroy the very 
stability of civilization that allowed the Christian message to be spread. In this way, Christian 
teaching essentially was a danger not only to the Roman Empire specifically but to the peace that 
any great civilization like Rome ensures. 
 Throughout all of Celsus’ work, he demonstrates the deep and varied problems he had 
with Christianity and its followers. The three major parts of any religion – deity, doctrine, and 
followers – are all deeply flawed when it comes to Christianity. In short, there was no redeeming 
aspect to this new faith. It is no surprise, then, that Celsus’ work seems to have made quite an 
impact on early Christians to the extent that Origen was urged to write his refutation 75 years 
after Celsus wrote Λόγος Ἀληθής. If readers agreed with Celsus’ arguments, they could only 
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come to the conclusion that Christianity is totally and completely empty. Thus, when Origen 
























CHAPTER THREE: THE POWER OF JESUS MANIFEST 
Considering how extreme and thorough Celsus is in his attack of Christianity, one would 
expect to find an equally zealous defense for the Christian faith in Origen’s Contra Celsum. It 
would seem that to counter such an offensive would require an apology that aimed to distinguish 
between true Christianity and Celsus’ perception of Christianity as much as possible. This type 
of defense, however, is not what it is found in Origen’s Contra Celsum. While Origen does 
indeed attempt to refute Celsus’ work, he does so not by providing a picture of Christianity that 
directly undermines Celsus’ false understanding. Instead, Origen actually confirms much of what 
Celsus criticizes about Christianity. In the course of his argument, Origen proves that Celsus has 
the correct understanding of Christianity to a great extent. This surprising method of answering 
Celsus’ work is hinted at even in the preface of Contra Celsum and is then more fully 
demonstrated in Book 1. In particular, Origen confirms that Celsus’ opinions on four significant 
aspects of Christianity are founded in truth: the consistent evangelizing of the lower classes of 
society; the common practice of interpreting Scripture allegorically; its unoriginality; and the 
birth, life, and death of Jesus. Origen’s discussion of these four things demonstrates that Celsus 
had a true understanding of what Christians believed. Celsus was right and Origen did not 
hesitate to confirm this fact. Still, his work is called Contra Celsum (“Against Celsus”) for a 
reason. Despite his confirmation of much of Celsus’ opinion, Origen is still in opposition to it. 
This chapter therefore will explore how Origen is able to confirm the truth of Celsus’ statements, 
yet still show him to be wrong about Christianity. As just noted, the preface of Contra Celsum 
gives Origen’s readers a first look at this strange mix of confirmation and opposition. After 
analyzing this introduction to his strategy, this chapter will focus on each of the four aspects of 
Christianity listed above in Book 1 in order to observe this strategy on full display. 
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Preface: Real Defenses and True Christians 
 Origen’s preface, although only 6 brief sections, gives much insight into his beliefs and 
the framework in which he is writing his work. Most of his preface is concerned with his 
explanation for why he has even written the Contra Celsum despite his initial misgivings in 
doing so. He opens the preface bluntly, writing: 
Ὁ μὲν σωτὴρ καὶ κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ψευδομαρτυρούμενος μὲν 
"ἐσιώπα" κατηγορούμενος δὲ "οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίνετο", πειθόμενος πάντα τὸν βίον 
ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐν Ἰουδαίοις πράξεις κρείττους γεγονέναι φωνῆς ἐλεγχούσης τὴν 
ψευδομαρτυρίαν καὶ λέξεων ἀπολογουμένων πρὸς τὰς κατηγορίας· σὺ δ' ὦ 
φιλόθεε Ἀμβρόσιε, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως πρὸς τὰς Κέλσου κατὰ Χριστιανῶν ἐν 
συγγράμμασι ψευδομαρτυρίας καὶ τῆς πίστεως τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν ἐν βιβλίῳ 
κατηγορίας ἐβουλήθης ἡμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἐναργοῦς ἐλέγχου ἐν 
τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ πάντων γραμμάτων κρείττονος λόγου, τοῦ τε τὰς 
ψευδομαρτυρίας ἀφανίζοντος καὶ ταῖς κατηγορίαις μηδὲ πιθανότητα εἰς τὸ 
δύνασθαί τι αὐτὰς ἐνδιδόντος. (Praef. 1) 
 
Our Saviour and Lord Jesus Christ was silent when false witnesses spoke against 
him, and answered nothing when he was accused; he was convinced that all his 
life and actions among the Jews were better than any speech in refutation of the 
false witness and superior to any words that he might say in reply to the 
accusations. And, God-loving Ambrose, I do not know why you wanted me to 
write an answer to Celsus’ false accusations in his book against the Christians and 
the faith of the churches. It is as though there was not in the mere facts a clear 
refutation better than any written reply, which dispels the false charges and 




From the very opening of Origen’s preface, he makes two things clear. Firstly, he has been 
commissioned to write this refutation by a man named Ambrose. He did not undertake this 
project because of some desire within himself, but did so in order to please and help others he 
knew. Secondly, he shows that the primary example that he follows in his own life is Jesus. This 
commitment to the primacy of Jesus (and the Scriptures which attest to his life) is clear 
throughout the entire Contra Celsum. Moreover, the connection that Origen makes between his 
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own work and the life of Jesus echoes the rhetoric employed by the apostle Paul in many of his 
letters. Lim discusses this statement made by Paul in 2 Corinthians 6:9: “as dying, and behold, 
we live.” Paul writes this paradox in the midst of a long list in verses 6:3-10 describing the 
sufferings he was facing in his ministry and the resiliency he had through them. He describes 
himself as “dying” because he faced “afflictions, hardships, calamities, beatings, imprisonments, 
riots, labors, sleepless nights, and hunger” (v. 4-5). However, he yet was living by “the Holy 
Spirit” and “the power of God” (v. 6, 7). Lim argues the following about this passage:  
The crucial point that Paul is making here is not that God delivers him from death, 
although that is no doubt true, but that he is the bearer of the dying of Jesus in 
order that the life of Jesus, the resurrection power of God, may be made manifest 
in him (cf. 2 Cor. 4.10-11). The fact that Paul continues to live to carry on his 





Paul’s rhetorical strategy in this passage, therefore, is to align his own sufferings with that of 
Jesus in order to make a larger point about God himself. Like Jesus, who was crucified then rose 
to life again, Paul sees his own process of “dying” through his various trials as only a step 
toward his own renewed life. By making this comparison, he is able to emphasize that God has 
the power to bring people back to life, whether literally, after a physical death, or metaphorically, 
after a series of great hardships brings them close to death. 
Origen also employs this strategy in the opening passage of the preface, comparing 
himself to Jesus in order to argue for a greater truth: that the facts of Christianity are self-evident. 
In other words, they need no further explanation to convince someone that Christianity is true. 
To demonstrate this, Origen immediately draws an analogy between his own position and Jesus’ 
before his death. Just like Jesus and the false witnesses at his trial, Origen was faced with “false 
accusations” from Celsus. Like Jesus, the things Origen was teaching about God provoked attack 
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from those who did not believe. With these commonalities in mind, Origen concludes that, 
following Jesus’ example, he too should remain silent in the face of false accusation. If Jesus 
thought that his actions should speak for themselves, why should Origen not think the same thing 
about the “mere facts” of Christianity? In this way, Origen is able to show his belief that the 
actual facts upon which Christianity rests are a better refutation than his own words.     
 One preliminary note should be made before proceeding in this analysis of the preface 
and Book 1. Chadwick here translates τοῖς πράγμασι as “facts,” a word which is very much a 
modern concept. The word “fact” indicates something that can be tangibly, empirically proven. 
No such concept existed in the ancient world. The Greek word translated by Chadwick as “fact” 
is τό πρᾶγμα, most literally rendered as “that which has been done” (Liddell & Scott). In this 
sense, the use of the word “fact” is anachronistic. A πρᾶγμα was something that was, at the very 
least, likely to happen and did not, therefore, necessarily have empirical evidence.
105
 However, I 
have chosen to follow Chadwick in using this idea of “fact” for two reasons. Firstly, Chadwick’s 
Contra Celsum is a highly respected translation of Origen’s work and one which I will use 
throughout this chapter. It is thus a natural decision to follow his lead in using the word “fact.” 
Secondly, I contend that, when Origen refers to the facts of Christianity, he believes them to be 
true without a doubt. He does not believe that the story of Jesus at his trial before his crucifixion 
“probably” happened or that Jesus “proabably” rose from the dead. Rather, the teaching in 
Scripture was factual truth for Origen. My remaining analysis of the preface and Book 1 of 
Contra Celsum aims to show that Origen’s entire apologetic strategy hinges upon this belief. 
The tension between a written refutation and the testimony of a life lived, which Origen 
presents in his opening passage, is the focus for most of the preface. As he continues from his 
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opening statement, he reiterates the tactic that Jesus took at his trial before he was crucified. He 
essentially asks why, if Jesus was truly God and could have easily proven his innocence by 
pointing to what he had done in his lifetime, he did not speak up at his trial. He was silent when 
he could have easily refuted any of the charges against him. Origen sees himself as being in the 
same position. He could speak against Celsus by writing a refutation of his arguments or he 
could be silent and let the evidence of Christianity speak for itself. He makes it clear that the 
latter option is the better one. As he goes on to write: Τολμῶ μὲν οὖν καί φημι ὅτι ἣν ἀξιοῖς 
ποιήσασθαι ἡμᾶς ἀπολογίαν ὑπεκλύει τὴν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀπολογίαν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφανῆ τοῖς 
οὐκ ἀναισθήτοις δύναμιν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ (Praef. 3). “I would therefore go so far as to say that the 
defence which you ask me to compose will weaken the force of the defence that is in the mere 
facts, and detract from the power of Jesus which is manifest to those who are not quite stupid.” 
This is a strong statement and shows Origen’s almost extreme opinion of written defenses of the 
Christian faith. He thinks it is actually a mistake to undertake such a project because it is 
destructive to what is the best kind of defense. 
 Despite this view, Origen obviously found some purpose for writing a refutation of 
Celsus’ work. He first gives a weak reason, saying that he simply did not want to back away 
from the task: Ὅμως δ' ἵνα μὴ δοκῶμεν ὀκνεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐπιταχθὲν ὑπὸ σοῦ, πεπειράμεθα 
ὑπαγορεῦσαι κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν δύναμιν πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπὸ Κέλσου γεγραμμένων τὸ φανὲν 
ἡμῖν ἀνατρεπτικὸν τῶν πιστὸν οὐδένα δυναμένων σεῖσαι λόγων αὐτοῦ (Praef. 4). “Nevertheless, 
that we may not appear to shirk the task which you have set us, we have tried our best to reply to 
each particular point in Celsus’ book and refute it as it seemed fitting to us, although his 
arguments cannot shake the faith of any true Christian.” Here, Origen makes it seem like his only 
motivation in continuing on with this project is simply to please those asking him to write a 
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refutation of Celsus. Based on later comments, however, this acts as only a secondary motivation 
to a nobler one. Before looking closer at his primary motivation, it is important to notice in the 
quotation above that Origen creates a dichotomy between a true Christian and an implied false 
Christian. This distinction plays a significant role in his preface and sets him up to give a 
stronger reason for why he wrote the Contra Celsum. 
 Origen goes on to define what makes a “true Christian” by using examples from the book 
of Romans. Specifically, in chapter 8, the apostle Paul discusses the resiliency of Christians 
which comes from being loved by God. Origen cites these famous verses from the end of 
Romans 8:  
Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or 
persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or danger, or sword? As it is written, 
 “For your sake we are being killed all the day long; 
  we are regarded as sheep to be slaughtered.” 
No, in all these things we are more than conquerors through him who loved us. 
For I am sure that neither death nor life, nor angels nor rulers, nor things present 
nor things to come, nor powers, nor height nor depth, nor anything else in all 





Origen draws two conclusions from this passage. One, he argues that Paul does not include 
written argument in the list of things that normally separate men from God. Rather, tribulation, 
distress, famine, nakedness, danger, and the sword are listed by Paul as dangers for Christians. 
The implication seems to be that true Christians would not be so shaken by Celsus’ argument 
that they would be separated from the love of Christ. No, true Christians surely could endure the 
attacks of Celsus’ pen when they stare down the sword each day. This implied sentiment is made 
explicit in the second conclusion that Origen comes to from Romans 8. In citing the second list 
in this passage - “death nor life, nor angels nor rulers,” etc. - he says that only true Christians like 
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Paul, the apostles, and “anyone like them” (Praef. 4) can make this boast. That is, only those 
secure enough in the love of God to face even death can call themselves true Christians. As such, 
he concludes the following: Τοίνυν οὐ συνήδομαι τῷ πιστεύσαντι εἰς Χριστόν, ὡς δύνασθαι 
σαλευθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν πίστιν ὑπὸ Κέλσου…ἤ τινος πιθανότητος λόγου (Praef. 4). “I have no 
sympathy with anyone who had faith in Christ such that it could be shaken by Celsus...or by any 
plausibility of argument.” Taking all of this together, a true Christian simply would not be 
affected by Celsus’ arguments because the love of Christ would make them strong enough to 
withstand far worse. 
 With this definition of a Christian in mind, Origen gives a second motivation for writing 
Contra Celsum, which is a much stronger one. He writes:  
Οὐκ οἶδα δ' ἐν ποίῳ τάγματι λογίσασθαι χρὴ τὸν δεόμενον λόγων πρὸς τὰ Κέλσου 
κατὰ Χριστιανῶν ἐγκλήματα ἐν βίβλοις ἀνα γραφομένων, ἀποκαθιστάντων αὐτὸν 
ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν πίστιν σεισμοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ στῆναι ἐν αὐτῇ. Ὅμως δ' ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ 
πλήθει τῶν πιστεύειν νομιζομένων εὑρεθεῖεν ἄν τινες τοιοῦτοι, ὡς σαλεύεσθαι 
μὲν καὶ ἀνατρέπεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν Κέλσου γραμμάτων θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς 
αὐτὰ ἀπολογίας, ἐὰν ἔχῃ χαρακτῆρά τινα καθαιρετικὸν τῶν Κέλσου καὶ τῆς 
ἀληθείας παραστατικὸν τὰ λεγόμενα, ἐλογισάμεθα πεισθῆναί σου τῇ προστάξει 
καὶ ὑπαγορεῦσαι πρὸς ὃ ἔπεμψας ἡμῖν σύγγραμμα· (Praef. 4) 
 
I do not know in what category I ought to reckon one who needs written 
arguments in books to restore and confirm him in his faith after it has been shaken 
by the accusations brought by Celsus against the Christians. But nevertheless, 
since among the multitude of people supposed to believe some people of this kind 
might be found, who may be shaken and disturbed by the writings of Celsus, and 
who may be restored by the reply to them if what is said is of a character that is 
destructive of Celsus’ arguments and clarifies the truth, we decided to yield to 
your demand and to compose a treatise in reply to that which you sent us. 
 
The curious nature of Origen’s preface is especially shown in this passage. While he personally 
is opposed to relying on written arguments at the expense of the facts themselves, he does not 
want to leave Celsus completely unanswered. And since the facts of Christianity clearly were not 
sufficient to persuade Celsus and other “people supposed to believe,” he sets out to write the 
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Contra Celsum because those who asked him to do so believed that Christians would be helped 
by it. As he says, these people “may be restored by the reply” to Celsus’ work. And so, even 
though he does not have much confidence in it, he wrote this refutation in case his written words 
may be enough to help those “shaken” by Celsus. 
 Here again, Origen sounds much like the Apostle Paul. His perplexity over the fact that 
many Christians had been wounded by Celsus’ words recalls Paul’s comments at the beginning 
of Galatians. Paul writes this in Galatians 1:6-7: “I am astonished that you are so quickly 
deserting him who called you in the grace of Christ and are turning to a different gospel— not 
that there is another one, but there are some who trouble you and want to distort the gospel of 
Christ.” And later, in 3:1-6, after reminding them of the true “gospel of Christ,” he writes: 
O foolish Galatians! Who has bewitched you? It was before your eyes that Jesus 
Christ was publicly portrayed as crucified. Let me ask you only this: Did you 
receive the Spirit by works of the law or by hearing with faith? Are you so 
foolish? Having begun by the Spirit, are you now being perfected by the flesh? 
Did you suffer so many things in vain—if indeed it was in vain? Does he who 
supplies the Spirit to you and works miracles among you do so by works of the 
law, or by hearing with faith – just as Abraham “believed God, and it was counted 
to him as righteousness”? 
 
Paul is asking this of the Galatians: If you have truly understood the gospel and received the 
Holy Spirit, how can you be so easily led away by false teaching? The implication, echoing the 
discussion of Romans 8 above, is that true Christians – those who believe the true gospel – 
would not stumble over falsehoods. This is precisely the point that Origen makes, and precisely 
the tone he has in making it. Both men were exasperated that supposed “Christians” were so 
weak in adhering to their religion and both were stern in their rebuke of those Christians. Even 
more, despite their harsh words for their audiences, they continue on to present the truth to them, 
with Paul preaching the true gospel to the Galatians and Origen producing the Contra Celsum. 
Thus, for both Paul and Origen, the main goal of their work was to reiterate true Christian 
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teaching. However, they both accomplished this goal by first scolding the weakness of the 
Christians who allowed themselves to be led astray from that teaching. 
 Even this brief look at Origen’s opinion on written refutations and his motivation for 
writing the Contra Celsum signals to readers the curious nature of his work. Indeed, who would 
expect him to open his written refutation by questioning the effectiveness of such a refutation? In 
this way, Origen presents a paradox to his readers: despite rejecting the power of a written 
defense, he himself writes quite a comprehensive written defense against Celsus. This paradox 
only previews the greater paradox of his apologetic strategy as a whole: that Origen finds much 
that is truthful in Celsus’ arguments, while still writing an entire work devoted to deconstructing 
those very arguments.  
More importantly, the preface previews the rest of the Contra Celsum in another way. As 
he makes abundantly clear, Origen argues that the facts of Christianity are themselves, with no 
additions, enough to persuade men that this was the true faith. However, this belief in the power 
of Christianity clearly did not play out in reality with Celsus and those “shaken” by his work. In 
response to this seeming failure of the power of the facts of Christianity, Origen is bewildered. 
As already quoted, he had “no sympathy with anyone who had faith in Christ such that it could 
be shaken by Celsus…or by any plausibility of argument” and he did not know how to “reckon 
one who needs written arguments in books to restore and confirm him in his faith after it has 
been shaken by accusations brought by Celsus against the Christians” (Praef. 4). Origen’s 
comments here demonstrate a crucial fact: the unbelief of Celsus and others did not cause Origen 
to question at all the truth of Christianity. In general, the unbelief of men did not signal a 
weakness in Christianity, but only a flaw in the men who did not believe. This idea is only 
confirmed in another comment of Origen’s quoted before: “I would therefore go so far as to say 
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that the defence which you ask me to compose will weaken the force of the defence that is in the 
mere facts, and detract from the power of Jesus which is manifest to those who are not quite 
stupid” (Praef. 3). The truth of Christianity is “manifest to those who are not quite stupid” – 
therefore implying a condemnation of those who do not believe.  
It is this commitment to and unwavering belief in the facts of Christianity that informs all 
of Origen’s apologetic strategy. When he finds in Celsus’ work much that is true about 
Christianity, he does not hesitate to point out and even endorse that truth. His focus, rather, in 
refuting Celsus is to deconstruct all the arguments and conclusions Celsus builds upon those 
facts. Though those who already do not believe the facts of Christianity are hard to win to the 
faith, perhaps Origen’s written arguments may make some progress toward that end. With this 
framework in mind, it is necessary to turn to Book 1 to see the fleshing out of Origen’s 
apologetic strategy. 
 
Book 1: Confirmation and Opposition 
As discussed before, there are four aspects of Christianity that Origen addresses in Book 
1 and which display his apologetic strategy most clearly. These four aspects are: the Christian 
proselytizing of the lowest people in society; the allegorical interpretation of Scripture; 
Christianity’s unoriginality; and the birth, life, and death of Jesus. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
the Christian evangelization of the lowest class of society occupies much of Celsus’ work. He 
views Christians as unintelligent people who spread their false and rebellious doctrine 
throughout Rome like a virus. Even more, they are energetic in their evangelizing to no real end 
because their doctrine is ultimately false. In light of this critique, one would expect that Origen, 
in an effort to defend the Christian faith, would try to give examples of how Christians do think 
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deeply about their faith and have well-founded reasons for their beliefs. Indeed, Origen himself 
is a prime example of this. He was steeped in Christian doctrine, writing prolifically about it, 
preaching it, and teaching it to others in his school in Alexandria. However, this is not his 
primary strategy. 
Instead, Origen explicitly acknowledges the Christian outreach to those unfamiliar with 
any schooling. In 1.9 of Contra Celsum, he cites the following complaint from Celsus’ work: 
Ὡς γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις πολλάκις μοχθηροὶ ἄνθρωποι ἐπιβαίνοντες τῇ ἰδιωτείᾳ τῶν 
εὐεξαπατήτων ἄγουσιν αὐτοὺς ᾗ βούλονται, οὕτως φησὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Χριστιανοῖς 
γίνεσθαι. Φησὶ δέ τινας μηδὲ βουλομένους διδόναι ἢ λαμβάνειν λόγον περὶ ὧν 
πιστεύουσι χρῆσθαι τῷ "Μὴ ἐξέταζε ἀλλὰ πίστευσον" καὶ "Ἡ πίστις σου σώσει 
σε." Καί φησιν αὐτοὺς λέγειν· "Κακὸν ἡ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ σοφία ἀγαθὸν δ' ἡ μωρία." 
(1.9) 
 
For just as among [other religious cults] scoundrels frequently take advantage of 
the lack of education of gullible people and lead them wherever they wish, so 
also, he says, this happens among the Christians. He says that some do not even 
want to give or to receive a reason for what they believe, and use such 
expressions as ‘Do not ask questions; just believe’, and ‘Thy faith will save thee’. 
And he affirms that they say: ‘The wisdom in the world is an evil, and foolishness 
a good thing.’ 
 
This passage echoes those which were discussed in Chapter 2 concerning Celsus’ low opinion of 
Christian followers. In response to this accusation, Origen does not shy away from the fact that 
Christians do indeed call “gullible people.” He writes the following: 
Λεκτέον δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο ὅτι εἰ μὲν ἷόν τε πάντας καταλιπόντας τὰ τοῦ βίου 
πράγματα σχολάζειν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν, ἄλλην ὁδὸν οὐ μεταδιωκτέον οὐδενὶ ἢ 
ταύτην μόνην. Εὑρεθήσεται γὰρ ἐν τῷ χριστιανισμῷ οὐκ ἐλάττων, ἵνα μὴ 
φορτικόν τι εἴπω, ἐξέτασις τῶν πεπιστευμένων…Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀμήχανον πῇ μὲν διὰ 
τὰς τοῦ βίου ἀνάγκας πῇ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσθένειαν, σφόδρα ὀλίγων 
ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ᾀττόντων, ποία ἂν ἄλλη βελτίων μέθοδος πρὸς τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς 
βοηθῆσαι εὑρεθείη τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῖς ἔθνεσι παραδοθείσης; (1.9) 
 
My answer to this is that if every man could abandon the business of life and 
devote his time to philosophy, no other course ought to be followed but this alone. 
For in Christianity, if I make no vulgar boasting, there will be found to be no less 
profound study of the writings that are believed...However, if this is impossible, 
since, partly owing to the necessities of life and partly owing to human weakness, 
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very few people are enthusiastic about rational thought, what better way of 
helping the multitude could be found other than that given to the nations by Jesus? 
 
In this passage, Origen acknowledges that Christians may be uneducated for two different 
reasons: one, “the necessities of life”; and two, “human weakness.” Both things hold men back 
from a life of study, which alone can result in the kind of sophistication that Celsus finds lacking 
in Christian people. Moreover, Origen makes it clear that the “multitude” is still pursued by 
Christians despite their ignorance. As he asks, why would they not teach the common multitude 
about Jesus when doing so would bring them much benefit? Thus, Origen confirms both aspects 
to Celsus’ complaint about Christians: one, that they are uneducated; and two, that they actively 
seek out other uneducated people in order to convert them. 
 Despite the fact that Celsus’ observations were accurate, Origen continues by showing 
how Celsus still does not understand the whole truth. Origen’s criticism is subtle at first, but then 
is made explicit in 1.10. As already mentioned, Origen cites two reasons why Christians are not 
able to “abandon the business of life” and devote themselves to study: the “necessities of life” 
and “human weakness.” Indeed, these two burdens simply discourage men from being interested 
in serious study at all. As Origen writes, “very few people are enthusiastic about rational 
thought” (1.9). In this description, Origen implicitly criticizes Celsus’ arguments by attributing 
Christians’ lack of study not to something essential to Christianity but to the general conditions 
of human life. He does not say that it is the necessities of a specifically Christian life or the 
weakness of Christians that cause them to scorn study and rational thought. Instead, it is the 
unavoidable nature of humans that turns people away from these things. By generalizing from 
Christians to all people, Origen is able to begin a subtle undermining of Celsus’ harsh ideas 
about Christians. Though his observations about them may be true, the simplicity he dislikes is 
not due to their faith but to the essential nature of humans. 
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Origen continues on in this deconstruction of Celsus’ argument in 1.10, where he makes 
this subtle critique more explicit. He writes: 
Τίς γὰρ προτραπεὶς ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἀποκληρω τικῶς ἐπί τινα αἵρεσιν ἑαυτὸν 
φιλοσόφων ῥίψας ἢ τῷ εὐπο ρηκέναι τοιοῦδε διδασκάλου ἄλλως ἐπὶ τοῦτο 
ἔρχεται ἢ τῷ πιστεύειν τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκείνην κρείττονα εἶναι;…ἀλλ' ἀλόγῳ τινί, 
κἂν μὴ βούλωνται τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, φορᾷ ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τὸ ἀσκῆσαι, φέρ' εἰπεῖν, 
τὸν στωϊκὸν λόγον, καταλιπόντες τοὺς λοιπούς, ἢ τὸν πλατωνικόν, 
ὑπερφρονήσαντες ὡς ταπεινοτέρων τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ τὸν περιπατητικὸν ὡς 
ἀνθρωπικώτατον καὶ μᾶλλον τῶν λοιπῶν αἱρέσεων εὐγνωμόνως ὁμολογοῦντα τὰ 
ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθά. (1.10) 
 
But, even if they do not admit it, in practice others do the same. What man who is 
urged to study philosophy and throws himself into some school of philosophers at 
random or because he has met a philosopher of that school, comes to do this for 
any reason except that he has faith that this school is better?...Even though they 
do not want to admit it, it is by unreasoning impulse that people come to the 
practice of, say, Stoicism and abandon the rest; or Platonism, because they 
despise the others as of lesser significance; or Peripateticism, because it 
corresponds best to human needs and sensibly admits the value of the good things 
of human life more than other systems. 
 
Origen’s point here is that all men dive into religions or philosophical schools in an unthinking 
way, on feeling alone. Even those who choose to pursue thought and rational study only do so 
after irrationally choosing what they believe. As he says, people choose the system they believe 
“corresponds best to human needs and sensibly admits the value of the good things of human 
life.” That is to say, people don’t ensure that they can provide reasonable arguments for their 
beliefs before they form those beliefs – no matter if it is Christians or followers of a different 
religion or philosophical school. For all men, it is the belief that comes first and not reason. This 
dynamic between reason and faith will be examined further as Origen’s discussion of this topic 
continues. However, at this point, it is important to see that Origen has already dealt a significant 
blow to Celsus’ argument by simply pointing out that he does not address this tendency in all 
men to scorn rational study. If Origen is right in his assessment of human nature, then Celsus 
looks as if he is only criticizing Christians because he dislikes them. As Chadwick notes, “There 
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is an emotional heat apparent in his dogged insistence on the anti-cultural nature of 
Christianity.”
107
 In other words, though Celsus rightly observes the relative ignorance of 
Christians, his conclusions are shallow and unfounded in the complete truth of the situation. His 
emotional reaction to Christians causes him to “shut his eyes to the fact of a rational Christian 
theology.”
108
 In short, he saw what he wanted to see about Christians and did not take care to 
form well-reasoned conclusions about them. It is therefore Celsus in the end who is unthinking 
and believes what is actually false. Indeed, Celsus’ emotional reaction proves the very point 
Origen makes in this section: that all men choose to believe – or disbelieve – a “system” based 
on their feelings about it. 
 In addition to pointing out Celsus’ irrational response to Christian practice, Origen works 
to undermine Celsus’ argument by pointing to the benefit that Christianity brings to the 
uneducated. He first asks, in the quotation cited above from 1.9: “What better way of helping the 
multitude could be found other than that given to the nations by Jesus?” Although the 
“multitude” cannot all be educated, they can all hear about Jesus. He continues this sentiment as 
1.9 goes on, writing:  
Καὶ πυνθανόμεθά γε περὶ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν πιστευόντων…πότερον βέλτιόν ἐστιν 
αὐτοῖς ἀλόγως πιστεύουσι κατεστάλθαι πως τὰ ἤθη καὶ ὠφελῆσθαι διὰ τὴν περὶ 
τῶν κολαζομένων ἐπὶ ἁμαρτίαις καὶ τιμωμένων ἐπὶ ἔργοις χρηστοῖς πίστιν, ἢ μὴ 
προσίεσθαι αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστρο φὴν μετὰ ψιλῆς πίστεως, ἕως ἂν ἐπιδῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς 
ἐξετάσει λόγων; (1.9) 
 
Moreover, concerning the multitude of believers...is it better that those who 
believe without thought should somehow have been made reformed characters 
and be helped by the belief that they are punished by sin and rewarded for good 
works, or that we should not allow them to be converted with simple faith until 
they might devote themselves to the study of rational arguments? 
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Here, Origen builds his argument from the fact that Christianity improves the lives of its 
followers. Christians have “reformed characters” and are “helped” by their faith. Thus, he asks: 
In light of this, is it not better to bring them to faith even if it is in relative ignorance? That is, it 
is better to improve the lives of the ignorant with faith than to reserve that faith only to the 
learned. While the faithful may very well respond only with “Do not ask questions; just believe” 
and “Thy faith will save thee” when asked about their beliefs – just as Celsus complains (1.9) – 
their improved lives will be worth it. Thus, in this example, there is a clear difference in Origen’s 
and Celsus’ opinions. To Origen, faith adds greater value to a man’s life than reason. As such, if 
someone had to choose between the two, faith should be preferred.  
If someone is able to pursue reason, however, Origen does not just dismiss faith 
altogether. This nuance to Origen’s argument causes him to differ even more from Celsus. Not 
only does Celsus implicitly argue for the superiority of reason over faith by criticizing irrational 
Christians, he also makes a clear statement to this effect. In 1.9, Origen cites these words written 
by Celsus: “After this he urges us to follow reason and a rational guide in accepting doctrines 
on the ground that anyone who believes people without doing so is certain to be deceived.” Thus, 
reason alone should be the basis on which men “accept doctrines.” Origen, however, still argues 
that there is value in having faith even in combination with reason. Van Winden articulates 
Origen’s stance well in his discussion of 1.11:  
Origen adds: "In respect of these matters a man who not only believes, but also 
uses reason in considering these questions, will declare the proofs that suggest 
themselves to him which he may discover as the result of an exhaustive inquiry". 
Obviously Origen aims here at the possibility of founding faith on reasonable 
arguments (ἀπόδειξεις). This can be done by the man who has πίστις μετά λόγου 
[“faith along with reason”], or, as it is said here, ὁ μή πιστεύων μόνον, ἀλλά καί 
λόγῳ θεωρων [“one not believing alone, but also considering with reason”]. The 
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importance of this observation is obvious. Origen points out that the Christian 




Once a man has faith, then reason should be added so that he can “declare” or fully explain those 
things that are suggested to him by faith alone. Faith, therefore, is an essential and prior step 
towards a sophisticated rational understanding of any religious or philosophical system. In this 
way, faith is preferable to reason for both foolish and learned men. The former benefit more from 
faith alone than from reason alone; the latter benefit from acquiring faith first in order to guide 
what they should apply their reason to. This conclusion therefore completes Origen’s second 
method of undermining Celsus’ arguments about Christian evangelization of common men. Not 
only does Origen point out the weakness of those arguments by showing the human weakness of 
all men, he also deconstructs Celsus’ presumptions about the superiority of reason over faith. 
These two methods of opposing Celsus on this particular topic are prime examples of 
Origen’s overall apologetic strategy. The nuanced argumentation he displays in considering 
Christian evangelization can only come about as a result of his initial agreement with Celsus. 
Origen is not ashamed of the fact that Christians seek to convert all men – ignorant and educated. 
This fact on its own ought to be an endorsement of Christianity to all men who know it. Celsus 
errs, therefore, in thinking that Christian evangelization is an inherently evil aspect of the faith. 
Origen’s strategy, therefore, of first confirming Celsus’ facts but then opposing his arguments 
demonstrates that Celsus is simply drawing the incorrect conclusions from the facts that he has. 
If he truly understood those facts, he would say with Origen that even simple men ought to 
believe in Christian teaching. 
Origen’s apologetic strategy is next revealed through an examination of his treatment of 
Celsus’ complaint about the allegorical interpretation of Scripture. This Christian method of 
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understanding their teachings is one that Celsus often attacks in his treatise. He mentions several 
different Christian teachings which tend to be interpreted allegorically and is greatly scornful of 
all these attempts. Of the creation of Eve from Adam, he argues that the only way this story 
makes sense is allegorically and “in its literal form is only fit for the ears of old women” 
(4.36).
110
 Similarly, the story of Noah and the ark is “nothing more than a debased and 
nonsensical version of the myth of Deucalion” and a story “for the hearing of small children” 
(4.41).
111
 He lists many stories of this type and Origen records his final conclusion about 
Christian allegories: 
Ἐπὶ πλεῖον δ' ἐξέτεινα τὸν λόγον βουλόμενος παραστῆσαι μὴ ὑγιῶς εἰρῆσθαι τῷ 
Κέλσῳ ὅτι οἱ ἐπιεικέστεροι Ἰουδαίων καὶ Χριστιανῶν πειρῶνταί πως ἀλληγορεῖν 
αὐτά, ἔστι δ' οὐχ οἷα ἀλληγορίαν ἐπιδέχεσθαί τινα ἀλλ' ἄντικρυς εὐηθέστατα 
μεμυθολόγηται… ἅπερ εἰ ἀνεγνώκει, οὐκ ἂν ἔλεγεν· Αἱ γοῦν δοκοῦσαι περὶ αὐτῶν 
ἀλληγορίαι γεγράφθαι πολὺ τῶν μύθων αἰσχίους εἰσὶ καὶ ἀτοπώτεραι, τὰ μηδαμῆ 
μηδαμῶς ἁρμοσθῆναι δυνάμενα θαυμαστῇ τινι καὶ παντάπασιν ἀναισθήτῳ μωρίᾳ 
συνάπτουσαι. (4.50, 51) 
 
I have ventured upon an extended discussion from a desire to show that Celsus is 
incorrect when he says that the more reasonable Jews and Christians try 
somehow to allegorize them, but they are incapable of being explained in this 
way, and are manifestly very stupid fables…But if he had read [Christian 
allegories] he would not have said: At any rate, the allegories which seem to have 
been written about them are far more shameful and preposterous than the myths, 
since they connect with some amazing and utterly senseless folly ideas which 
cannot by any means be made to fit.
 
 
What is most interesting about this statement is that Celsus sarcastically labels those who 
interpret Scripture allegorically as “reasonable.” The Christian Scriptures by their very nature are 
absurd and the only reasonable way in which someone can believe them, Celsus argues, is if they 
read them allegorically. Despite this, he still finds fault with even these reasonable Christians. 
Instead of their allegories disguising the absurdity of their teachings, they only serve to highlight 
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the silly nature of those teachings. So, while allegory may be the next logical step for Christians 
if they already believe in the absurd things they do, it still does not give them any more 
respectability in Celsus’ eyes. Once someone has already committed himself to believing in 
Christianity, he has already proven himself to be a fool. All that he does after he first believes is 
equally contemptible. 
Origen’s response to Celsus’ criticism of Christian allegorization provides the next 
example of the great extent to which Origen confirms Celsus’ complaints about Christians. 
Indeed, Origen makes it abundantly clear by two different methods that Christians truly do 
interpret Scripture allegorically: one, by providing an explicit justification of the practice; and 
two, by utilizing this type of interpretation throughout Book 1. Origen’s justification of allegory 
comes when he addresses Celsus’ accusation that the story of the dove descending to Jesus after 
his baptism cannot be confirmed as historical fact.
112
 In response to this accusation, Origen 
writes: Πρὶν ἀρξώμεθα τῆς ἀπολογίας, λεκτέον ὅτι σχεδὸν πᾶσαν ἱστορίαν, κἂν ἀληθὴς ᾖ, 
βούλεσθαι κατασκευάζειν ὡς γεγενημένην καὶ καταληπτικὴν ποιῆσαι περὶ αὐτῆς φαντα σίαν τῶν 
σφόδρα ἐστὶ χαλεπωτάτων καὶ ἐν ἐνίοις ἀδύνατον (1.42). “Before we begin the defence, we must 
say that an attempt to substantiate almost any story as historical fact, even if it is true, and to 
produce complete certainty about it, is one of the most difficult tasks and in some cases 
impossible.” He next uses multiple examples from Greek mythology, such as the Trojan War and 
the Oedipus saga, to demonstrate the difficulty of this task. The truth of the Trojan War, for 
example, is hard to prove because “it is bound up with the impossible story about a certain 
Achilles…” and many others (1.42).  
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Because of the nearly impossible nature of proving a story to be historical fact, Origen 
concludes that  
Ἀλλ' ὁ εὐγνωμόνως ἐντυγχάνων ταῖς ἱστορίαις καὶ βουλόμενος ἑαυτὸν τηρεῖν καὶ 
ἐν ἐκείναις ἀνεξαπάτητον κρινεῖ, τίσι μὲν συγκαταθήσεται τίνα δὲ τροπολογήσει, 
τὸ βούλημα ἐρευνῶν τῶν ἀναπλασαμένων τὰ τοιαδί, καὶ τίσιν ἀπιστήσει ὡς διὰ 
τὴν πρός τινας χάριν ἀναγεγραμμένοις. (1.42) 
  
Anyone who reads the stories with a fair mind, who wants to keep himself from 
being deceived by them, will decide what he will accept and what he will interpret 
allegorically, searching out the meaning of the authors who wrote the fictitious 
stories, and what he will disbelieve as having been written to gratify certain 
people. 
 
His discussion of finding historical fact in fantastic stories sets up a general principle for Origen. 
Although it is impossible to verify historical fact in every story, there is still value in those 
stories since men can seek out a higher meaning that the author intended them to discover. 
Origen soon applies this general principle to his interpretation of Scripture. As he 
continues in 1.48, he discusses these verses from the book of Ezekiel as a demonstration for why 
men should interpret Scripture allegorically: “In the thirtieth year, in the fourth month, on the 
fifth day of the month, as I was among the exiles by the Chebar canal, the heavens were opened 
and I saw visions of God” (Ezekiel 1:1). And further, Origen cites Ezekiel’s words after he sees 
the image of the throne of God and a figure sitting in it: “Such was the appearance of the likeness 
of the glory of the Lord. And when I saw it, I fell on my face, and I heard the voice of one 
speaking” (Ezekiel 1:28). These verses certainly tell a fantastical story and Origen’s 
interpretation of it is allegorical through and through. A literal understanding of these verses 
would be that the sky actually was torn open and Ezekiel truly looked at God on his throne. 
Origen, however, argues that what Ezekiel saw was only a vision. After noting that visions 
themselves are not that outlandish of an occurrence, for they are just like dreams, he says:  
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Ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνω τὸν αἰσθητὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνεῷχθαι καὶ τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ 
ἀνοιγνύμενον διῃρῆσθαι, ἵνα ἀναγράψῃ τὸ τοιοῦτον Ἰεζεκιήλ. Μή ποτ' οὖν καὶ 
ἐπὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος τὸν φρονίμως ἀκούοντα τῶν εὐαγγελίων τὸ ὅμοιον ἐκδεκτέον, 
κἂν προσκόπτῃ τὸ τοιοῦτον τοῖς ἁπλουστέροις, οἳ διὰ πολλὴν ἁπλότητα κινοῦσι 
τὸν κόσμον, σχίζοντες τὸ τηλικοῦτον σῶμα ἡνωμένον τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ. (1.48) 
 
For I do not imagine that the visible heaven was opened, or its physical form 
divided for Ezekiel to record such an experience. Perhaps therefore the intelligent 
reader of the gospels ought to give a similar interpretation also in respect of the 
Saviour, even if this opinion may cause offence to the simple-minded, who in 
their extreme naivete move the world and rend the vast, solid mass of the entire 
heaven. 
 
Origen’s interpretation here signals very clearly that he did not take this story literally. He is 
even sarcastic and dismissive of “simple-minded” and “naïve” people who believe that these 
words from Ezekiel represent a true, historical event. Instead, he advocates that readers of the 
Scriptures – whether in books like Ezekiel or the gospels – be “intelligent” and apply allegorical 
interpretation in circumstances in which the use of literal interpretation would force one to 
“move the world and rend the vast, solid mass of the entire heaven.”  
Origen only rounds out this commitment to allegorical interpretation as 1.48 comes to a 
close. The last point he makes it that that there is a “divine sense” which a “blessed” man 
acquires on earth. As proof, he cites verses from Scripture that support the idea that each of a 
man’s senses - sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch - has a physical and spiritual dimension. For 
example, he writes that "Χριστοῦ εὐωδία" λέγει εἶναι "τῷ θεῷ" Παῦλος, καὶ ἁφῆς, καθ' ἣν 
Ἰωάννης φησὶ ταῖς χερσὶν ἐψηλαφηκέναι "περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς" (1.48) – “Paul speaks of a 
‘sweet savour of Christ unto God,’ and a sense of touch in accordance with which John says that 
he has handled with his hands ‘of the Word of life.’”
113
 Origen therefore saw himself to be on the 
side of the apostle himself in employing allegory in reading Scripture. Just as Paul understood 
there to be a spiritual dimension to life, so also does Origen understand the multilayered meaning 
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in Scripture. He would be ignoring an apostolic mandate, in essence, if he naively avoided 
allegorical interpretation simply because it confused or offended the “simple-minded,” as he says 
above. 
 Taking all of this together, it is clear that Origen overwhelmingly confirms the Christian 
practice of employing allegory in interpreting their Scriptures. On this topic especially, he is bold 
in showing Celsus’ observations to be factual. This is due to his commitment to using allegory 
himself. This zealous attitude towards allegory, however, constitutes Origen’s implicit 
opposition to Celsus. The latter views the allegorization of Scripture as yet another reason to 
dislike the practices of Christians. His comment cited above seems to indicate that it is not 
allegory itself that he opposes. Rather, it is the Christians’ mishandling of allegory that vexes 
him. Recall his words:  
The more reasonable Jews and Christians try somehow to allegorize [the stories in 
Scripture], but they are incapable of being explained in this way, and are 
manifestly very stupid fables…At any rate, the allegories which seem to have 
been written about them are far more shameful and preposterous than the myths, 
since they connect with some amazing and utterly senseless folly ideas which 
cannot by any means be made to fit. (4.50, 51) 
 
In other words, Christians incorrectly use the only type of interpretation suitable for their “stupid 
fables.” In this way, their use of allegory is for Celsus yet another sign of Christian foolishness. 
In stark contrast, however, Origen views this as a sign of maturity and sophistication. As 
mentioned several times already, it is the “simple-minded” who refuse to move beyond literal 
interpretation. The implication, therefore, is that those with a more complex intellect who are 
able to employ allegory.  
McCartney’s analysis of Origen’s opinion fleshes out his thoughts on the balance 
between literal and allegorical interpretation. As McCartney argues, Origen indeed views 
allegory as a more mature form of interpretation. However, it can only be more mature for 
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someone to interpret allegorically if he already interprets Scripture at a simpler level. Thus, 
Origen is not completely dismissive of literal interpretation, as his strong statements in 1.48 
might suggest. Indeed, McCartney writes: “At least three positive values to the literal meaning 
are mentioned by Origen in Contra Celsum—(1) the Bible contains true and important history, 
(2) the literal meaning has an edifying value for the simple, and (3) the literal has an apologetic 
value in attracting study.”
114
 Taking each of McCartney’s three points in turn, though Scriptural 
stories are sometimes hard to prove as historical fact, Origen does believe many to be actual 
history, especially the stories of Jesus. Literal interpretation is thus the only appropriate kind for 
those particular stories. Likewise, literal interpretation is the best kind for those who cannot 
attain to anything higher. This is the same dynamic seen with the Christian evangelization of 
common men. Just as an ignorant faith is better than a lack of faith, so literal interpretation of 
Scripture is better than scorning the interpretation of Scripture altogether. And, finally, literal 
interpretation is an important first step towards further study, as this gives men solid footing in 
reading Scripture before reaching a more mature level. In all three of these ways, literal 
interpretation is absolutely vital for Christians although it is truly a simpler version of 
interpretation than allegorical. It is quite clear, then, that Origen counts allegory as something 
admirable about Christian interpretation and not a further condemnation of it as Celsus does. 
The next major criticism in Celsus’ work that Origen engages with in Book 1 is the 
charge of Christianity’s unoriginality. Celsus argues that whatever good Christianity does offer - 
which is not much - can be found in a better form in other philosophical or religious systems. He 
talks specifically about the similarities that Christianity has with Greek philosophy and Graeco-
Roman religion. Origen records the following comments from Celsus concerning Christianity’s 
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relationship with Greek ideas (Celsus’ words in italics): Παρέθετο γὰρ πλειόνα μάλιστα 
Πλάτωνος ὁ Κέλσος, κοινοποιῶν τὰ δυνάμενα ἑλεῖν τινα καὶ συνετὸν ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων, 
φάσκων βέλτιον αὐτὰ παρ' Ἕλλησιν εἰρῆσθαι καὶ χωρὶς ἀνατάσεως καὶ ἐπαγγε λίας τῆς ὡς ἀπὸ 
θεοῦ ἢ υἱοῦ θεοῦ (6.1). “For Celsus has quoted several passages especially from Plato, 
comparing them with extracts from the holy scriptures such as could impress an intelligent 
person, saying that these ideas have been better expressed among the Greeks, who refrained 
from making exalted claims and from asserting that they had been announced by a god or the 
son of a god.” This complaint recalls much of what was observed in Chapter 2. Not only were 
Christians merely copying the ideas of its predecessors, they were doing so while pretending 
their faith was the only truth. Celsus especially focuses on Christian similarity to, and 
destruction, of Platonic doctrine. Celsus sees Christian imitation of Platonism as most egregious 
since Christian doctrine destroys the noble teachings of Plato. Therefore, Celsus’ arguments 
against Christian doctrine undermined the Christians claims to eternal truth in two ways: one, it 
was illogical to claim that such a young religion held truth when its more ancient predecessors 
did not; and two, these claims were an insult to greater doctrines like Platonism. 
 Origen too finds resonances between Christianity and its Greek philosophical 
predecessors, and seems highly disinterested in arguing against this fact. Indeed, Chadwick calls 
Origen’s response to Celsus on this point “remarkable.” He writes: “He simply accepts the 
proposition without demur. So far from Christianity being the worse for that [similarity to 
Graeco-Roman thought], it is evidence in its favour.”
115
 Origen argues that this connection 
between Christianity and Graeco-Roman ideas is one merit of Christianity in two ways. He first 
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explains why there are similarities between the two by applying a specific section of Scripture. 
While not quoting it directly, he alludes to the following passage from the book of Romans: 
For when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law requires, 
they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show 
that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience also 
bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse them on that 
day when, according to my gospel, God judges the secrets of men by Christ Jesus. 
(Romans 2:14-16) 
 
Written by the apostle Paul, this puts forth the idea that all men who do what is righteous do so 
according to God’s law. Even if a man has never heard of that law, Christians contend that the 
sense of right and wrong common to all humans is implanted by God into their hearts. In the 
same way, Origen argues, certain ideas of philosophy and religion are placed in the minds of 
men. He considers a passage from Celsus in which the latter compares the Christian prohibition 
against idolatry to this saying from Heraclitus: “Those who approach lifeless things as gods act 
like a man who holds conversation with houses” (1.5). While Celsus would have seen this 
fragment of Heraclitus as proof of Christianity’s unoriginality, Origen argues: Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ 
τούτου λεκτέον ὅτι ὁμοίως τῷ ἄλλῳ ἠθικῷ τόπῳ ἐγκατεσπάρησαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἔννοιαι, ἀφ' 
ὧν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος Ἑλλήνων ἢ βαρβάρων τοῦτ' ἐνενόησε κατασκευάσαι (1.5). 
“I would reply in this instance also, as in that of the other moral principles, that moral ideas have 
been implanted in men, and that it was from these that Heraclitus and any other Greek or 
barbarian conceived the notion of maintaining this doctrine.” He also points to Herodotus’ record 
of the Persians’ disbelief in idolatry, as well as statements from Zeno in Plato’s Republic, as 
additional examples of Greek accordance with the teachings of Christianity. Origen therefore 
makes a simple argument: the principles of Christianity - from God himself - existed before any 
philosophical system of man was articulated. 
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 Origen continues to acknowledge Christianity’s similarities with Greek thought in other 
sections of Book 1, explicitly confirming Celsus’ complaints about these very similarities. As he 
continues, however, he shows this connection between Christianity and Greek ideas implicitly by 
using Greek ideas to support the truth of Christian ones. For example, in 1.32-33, he discusses 
the virgin birth of Jesus and Celsus’ ridicule of that particular aspect of Christian doctrine. In 
particular, Celsus thinks the whole idea of the virgin birth is thoroughly false and Jesus was 
actually the result of his mother’s affair with a Roman soldier. Origen, however, dismisses this 
story, and tries to show the reasonableness of the concept of a virgin birth. He writes: 
ἆρα ὁ κατα πέμπων ψυχὰς εἰς ἀνθρώπων σώματα τὸν τοσαῦτα τολμή σοντα καὶ 
τοσούτους διδάξοντα καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς χύσεως τῆς κατὰ τὴν κακίαν μεταστήσοντα 
πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὴν πασῶν αἰσχροτέραν γένεσιν ὤθει, μηδὲ διὰ γάμων 
γνησίων αὐτὸν εἰσάγων εἰς τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον; Ἣ εὐλογώτερον ἑκάστην 
ψυχὴν κατά τινας ἀπορρήτους λόγους –λέγω δὲ ταῦτα νῦν κατὰ Πυθαγόραν καὶ 
Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα, οὓς πολλάκις ὠνόμασεν ὁ Κέλσος–, εἰσκρι νομένην 
σώματι κατ' ἀξίαν εἰσκρίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ τὰ πρότερα ἤθη; (1.32) 
 
Would He who sends souls down into human bodies compel a man to undergo a 
birth more shameful than any, and not even have brought him into human life by 
legitimate marriage, when he was to do such great deeds and to teach so many 
people and to convert many from the flood of evil? Or is it more reasonable (and I 
say this now following Pythagoras, Plato, and Empedocles, whom Celsus often 
mentions) that there are certain secret principles by which each soul that enters a 
body does so in accordance with its merits and former character? 
 
He even later cites “Zopyrus, Loxus, or Polemo” in 1.33, who are philosophers who put forth this 
same idea that a soul of a great man must have a suitable body. For example, Misener writes this 
about Loxus’ theory:  
The blood is the seat of the soul. The signs given by the whole body and its parts 
vary with the swiftness or inertia of the blood, its fineness and coarseness…When 
the blood is copious it causes the body to be large and ruddy…but it constricts, 
dulls, and intercepts the keenness of the intellect and the senses. If the blood is 
fine and small in quantity it produces a weaker body…[but] it nourishes the 
intelligence and stimulates its keenness.”
116
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In short, one’s soul, contained in the blood, has a direct correspondence with the constitution of 
the body. As such, all men with a certain admirable quality must have the same type of blood 
which in turn indicates the nature of their soul. Origen picks up on the similarity of this teaching 
with what Christian Scriptures teach about Jesus. He writes:  
τῇ οὖν μελλούσῃ παραδόξως ἐπιδημεῖν τῷ βίῳ καὶ μεγαλοποιεῖν ἔδει γενέσθαι 
σῶμα οὐχ, ὡς οἴεται Κέλσος, ἀπὸ Πανθήρα μοιχεύσαντος καὶ παρθένου 
μοιχευθείσης…ἀλλ' ὡς καὶ προφῆται προεῖπον, ἀπὸ παρθένου, κατ' ἐπαγγελίαν 
σημείου γεννώσης τὸν ἐπώνυμον πράγματος, δηλοῦντος ὅτι ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει αὐτοῦ 
μετ' ἀνθρώπων ἔσται θεός. (1.33) 
 
Then for a soul that was to live a miraculous life on earth and to do great things, a 
body was necessary, not, as Celsus thinks, produced by the adultery of Panthera 
and a virgin)…but, as the prophets foretold, the offspring of a virgin who 
according to the promised sign should give birth to a child whose name was 
significant of his work, showing that at his birth God would be with men.  
 
Just as with Loxus, Origen argues that such a great man like Jesus could only have one possible 
nature. His signs and greatness among men were so beyond the average that the only explanation 
was that he had a supernatural birth and character. It was simply not possible that such a great 
man would be the result of adultery between his mother and a common Roman soldier named 
Panthera, as Celsus had earlier charged (1.32). In this way, Origen draws a direct link between 
Graeco-Roman thought and Christian thought.  
 Origen’s defense against Celsus’ complaints of Christianity’s unoriginality certainly 
lacks much obvious opposition. He confirms every suspicion that Celsus had about Christian 
claims to universal and eternal truth by simply upending the temporal viewpoint with which 
Celsus was observing Christians. Just because Christians came on the scene chronologically after 
Plato, Loxus, Heraclitus, and others did not mean they were copying their ideas. Instead, 
Christians were fully articulating an eternal truth that God revealed only partially to Plato and 
others. In this way, Origen’s opposition actually comes through his commitment to upholding the 
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facts about Christianity. Celsus truly identified these facts, but he did not know what to make of 
them. Only a Christian like Origen, with the full teaching of Scripture, could accurately 
understand the implications of such facts. As Scarborough describes:  
Throughout the Contra Celsum, Origen endeavors to answer what he sees as the 
malformed hermeneutic informing Celsus' True Doctrine. His perspective, much 
like his opponent's, begins and ends with the Scriptures. As he argues, even the 
most learned of the Greeks, though surpassing many in their possession of human 




Both Origen and Celsus “begin and end with the Scripture” – that is, they are both starting from 
the same set of facts. However, it was Origen’s task to push back against the “malformed 
hermeneutic” that caused Celsus to draw the absolutely wrong conclusions about Christianity. 
Origen’s interaction with Celsus’ opinion of Christianity’s unoriginality, with its complete 
reversal in perspective, thus provides readers with one of the best examples of how Origen can 
still refute Celsus while still showing him to be right to a great extent. 
 Finally, Origen’s apologetic strategy can be seen clearly as he discusses Jesus and 
attempts to refute Celsus’ many criticisms about him. More specifically, Origen focuses on two 
aspects of Celsus’ complaint about Jesus: his low place in society and the persuasive effect he 
has on those around him. While not specifically discussed in Chapter 2, Celsus’ opinion of Jesus 
is just as critical as his opinion of the Christian God. Often, he applies his criticisms of God to 
Jesus himself, even though he personally does not believe the Christian claims that Jesus is a 
god.
118
 He writes this of the Christians’ savior: 
Ἄλλως μὲν οὖν παντελῶς θνητὰ ταῦτα καὶ οὐδ' ὅσια λέγειν, ὅτι δὴ ὁ μέγιστος 
θεός, βουλόμενός τι ἀνθρώπους ὠφελῆσαι, τὸν ἀντιπράσσοντα ἔχει καὶ ἀδυνατεῖ. 
Ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ παῖς ἄρα ἡττᾶται ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου, καὶ κολαζόμενος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ 
διδάσκει καὶ ἡμᾶς τῶν ὑπὸ τούτῳ κολάσεων καταφρονεῖν, προαγορεύων ὡς ἄρα 
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ὁ Σατανᾶς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁμοίως φανεὶς ἐπιδείξεται μεγάλα ἔργα καὶ θαυμαστά, 
σφετεριζόμενος τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόξαν· οἷς οὐ χρῆναι βουκοληθέντας ἀποτρέπεσθαι 
πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ πιστεύειν ἑαυτῷ. Ταῦτα μέν γε ἐστὶν ἄντικρυς 
ἀνθρώπου γόητος, ἐργολαβοῦντος καὶ προφυ λαττομένου τοὺς ἀντιδοξοῦντάς τε 
καὶ ἀνταγείροντας. (6.42) 
 
At all events these notions are entirely of mortal origin, and it is blasphemy to say 
that when the greatest God indeed wishes to confer some benefit upon men, He 
has a power which is opposed to Him, and so is unable to do it. The Son of God, 
then, is worsted by the devil, and is punished by him so that he may teach us also 
to despise the punishments which he inflicts on us. He declares that even Satan 
himself will appear in a similar way to that in which he has done and will 
manifest great and amazing works, usurping the glory of God. We must not be 
deceived by these, nor desire to turn away to Satan, but must believe in him alone. 
This is blatantly the utterance of a man who is a sorcerer, who is out for profit and 
is taking precautions against possible rivals to his opinions and to his begging. 
 
This passage is a good example of both aspects of Celsus’ criticism of Jesus. Firstly, Celsus 
scoffs at the weakness of Jesus. He refers to the Christian teaching of the existence of the devil, a 
being who opposes all the efforts of God. The supposed existence of such a creature and the idea 
that he can hinder God’s actions is “blasphemous” to Celsus. Just as observed in chapter 2 in 
Celsus’ discussion of God the Father, who allowed his son to die, the weakness of God leads to 
his incompetence. He puts forth the same idea here that the weakness of God, and specifically 
that of the Son of God, causes him to be “worsted by the devil.”  
This passage also shows Celsus’ opinion that Jesus is just like a magician because he 
performs miraculous deeds. Even worse, Celsus argues that Jesus does this in order to “profit” 
himself – gathering followers for himself and taking followers away from his “rivals.” The 
implication of Celsus’ argument here is that Jesus was nothing more than a sorcerer who tricked 
others into believing he was a god through his magical powers. He even argues that Jesus visited 
Egypt and “returned full of conceit because of these powers, and on account of them gave 
himself the title of God” (1.28). Gallagher is very helpful in drawing out the significance of this 
accusation from Celsus. He writes that magic for Celsus “bore the stigma of illiteracy and 
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immorality. Belief in, or practice of ‘garden-variety’ magic tended to provoke doubts about one’s 
character and abilities. To put it simply, common magicians could not be philosophers.”
119
 On a 
basic level, Jesus’ magical powers provoke a general suspicion of his character. However, there 
was something deeper at work for Celsus. If Jesus was truly a magician, he could not 
simultaneously be a serious philosopher introducing a serious doctrine to his followers. Instead, 
Jesus was “illiterate” and “immoral” and began a religion whose followers, even to Celsus’ day, 
were still believing an absurd doctrine and continuing the treacherous practices of their founder. 
 With this in mind, it is no surprise that Celsus also criticizes Jesus’ background as well. 
In two sections of Book 1, Origen addresses Celsus’ complaint about this using his specific type 
of apologetic strategy. Starting with 1.28-1.30, Origen handles the following words from Celsus: 
Μετὰ ταῦτα προσω ποποιεῖ Ἰουδαῖον αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενον τῷ Ἰησοῦ καὶ ἐλέγχοντα 
αὐτὸν περὶ πολλῶν μέν, ὡς οἴεται, πρῶτον δὲ ὡς πλασαμένου αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐκ 
παρθένου γένεσιν· ὀνειδίζει δ' αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκ κώμης αὐτὸν γεγονέναι 
ἰουδαϊκῆς καὶ ἀπὸ γυναικὸς ἐγχωρίου καὶ πενιχρᾶς καὶ χερνήτιδος. (1.28) 
 
After this [Celsus] represents the Jews as having a conversation with Jesus 
himself and refuting him on many charges, as he thinks: first, because he 
fabricated the story of his birth from a virgin ; and he reproaches [Jesus] because 
he came from a Jewish village and from a poor country woman who earned her 
living by spinning. 
 
In response to these comments, Origen makes it very clear what his opinion is in his first 
statement after citing the passage from Celsus. He says: Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα τῷ μηδὲν δυναμένῳ 
ἀβασάνιστον ἐᾶν τῶν λεγομένων ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπιστούντων ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἐξετάζοντι δοκεῖ μοι συμπνεῖν τῷ θεῖον γεγονέναι καὶ ἄξιον τῆς προρρήσεως περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ υἱὸν 
εἶναι τὸν Ἰησοῦν (1.28) “In my judgment, however (and I cannot allow anything said by 
unbelievers to pass unexamined, but study the fundamental principles), all these things are in 
harmony with the fact that Jesus was worthy of the proclamation that he is son of God.” “All 
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these things” that Origen refers to includes not only Jesus’ low birth, but his supposed magical 
powers. Origen does not explicitly agree with Celsus on the facts of Jesus’ life in this comment. 
However, his agreement is implicit. In order to refute Celsus’ claims, he argues that “all these 
things are in harmony” with a belief in Jesus’ divinity. The only way he can make that argument 
is if he acknowledges that Celsus was right to some extent about Jesus. Origen certainly does not 
confirm the wild claims that Celsus makes about Mary’s affair with a Roman soldier that caused 
her to become pregnant with Jesus (1.32), or Jesus’ magical powers, or other related claims. 
However, Origen confirms the heart of Celsus’ criticism that Jesus came from an unremarkable 
background and had an influence on others that could not be easily explained. This confirmation 
of the basic outline of Jesus’ life continues as Origen discusses more of Celsus’ criticisms. 
Before he turns to more confirmation, however, Origen makes a fuller analysis of Celsus’ 
arguments than his one comment already cited. He writes the following concerning Jesus’ low 
birth and his surprising ability to overcome that status: 
Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξετάζοι τις τὰ κατὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον, πῶς οὐκ ἂν ζητήσαι, τίνα 
τρόπον ἐν εὐτελείᾳ καὶ πενίᾳ ἀνατεθραμμένος καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐγκύκλιον παιδείαν 
παιδευθεὶς μηδὲ μαθὼν λόγους καὶ δόγματα, ἀφ' ὧν κἂν πιθανὸς γενέσθαι 
ἐδύνατο ὁμιλεῖν ὄχλοις καὶ δημαγωγεῖν καὶ ἐπάγεσθαι ἀκροατὰς πλείονας, 
ἐπιδίδωσιν ἑαυτὸν διδασκαλίᾳ καινῶν δογμάτων, ἐπεισάγων τῷ γένει τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων λόγον τά τε Ἰουδαίων ἔθη καταλύοντα μετὰ τοῦ σεμνοποιεῖν αὐτῶν 
τοὺς προφήτας καὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνων νόμους μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ θείου καθαιροῦντα; 
(1.29) 
 
If one were also to inquire further into the circumstances of such a man, how 
could one help trying to find out how a man, brought up in meanness and poverty, 
who had no general education and had learnt no arguments and doctrines by 
which he could have become a persuasive speaker to crowds and a popular leader 
and have won over many hearers, could devote himself to teaching new doctrines 
and introduce to mankind a doctrine which did away with the customs of the Jews 
while reverencing the prophets, and which abolished the laws of the Greeks 




Whereas Celsus views the circumstances of the birth of Jesus as an indictment against him, 
Origen makes this well-reasoned argument for Jesus’ birth to be a sign of his greatness. He 
makes the simple observation that it is easier for men born with advantage to become well-
known and influential. Those like Jesus, however, are simply not expected to be able to have the 
intelligence and effect that he actually did. The fact that he was able to overcome these things 
and influence as many people as he did is remarkable and signals that there is some greater 
power at work in Jesus. Celsus believes this to be magic; Origen the power of God. For who else 
but a god could accomplish so much after starting with so little? In this way, Origen draws a 
completely different conclusion about these facts than Celsus does. 
 Origen next turns to Celsus’ comments about Jesus’ death. Origen views even Jesus’ 
death as a sign of his greatness, while Celsus sees it as further evidence of Jesus’ baseness. 
Celsus in the following passage is directly arguing against the Christian claim that Jesus was the 
Logos (cf. John 1). However, in the midst of this discussion, he mentions Jesus’ death with great 
scorn:  
Μετὰ ταῦτα Χριστιανοῖς ἐγκαλεῖ ὡς σοφιζομένοις ἐν τῷ λέγειν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ 
εἶναι αὐτολόγον, καὶ οἴεταί γε κρατύνειν τὸ ἔγκλημα, ἐπεὶ λόγον ἐπαγγελλόμενοι 
υἱὸν εἶναι τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποδείκνυμεν οὐ λόγον καθαρὸν καὶ ἅγιον ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωπον 
ἀτιμότατα ἀπαχθέντα καὶ ἀποτυμπανισθέντα. (2.31) 
 
He next charges the Christians with being guilty of sophistical reasoning, in 
saying that the Son of God is the Logos Himself. And he thinks that he strengthens 
the accusation, because when we declare the Logos to be the Son of God, we do 
not present to view a pure and holy Logos, but a most degraded man, who was 
punished by scourging and crucifixion. 
 
Not only did Jesus not live up to the title of “Logos” that Christians gave him, but he was a 
“degraded man” who died by crucifixion. This maner of execution was especially disgraceful in 
Roman culture. In his thorough analysis of crucifixion in the Empire, Aubert describes who was 
usually condemned to death by this method, what crimes warranted such an execution, and the 
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stigma of crucifixion. While this kind of death was reserved mostly for slaves, Aubert notes that 
freeborn people were also subjected to it for crimes such as poisoning, military disobedience, 
insurrection/rebellion, and more.
120
 He notes that Jesus was probably condemned to crucifixion 
due to rebellion and even cites Celsus’ comments about Jesus’ seditious actions in Contra 
Celsum 2.12 in support of this conclusion. With all of this background in mind, Aubert writes 
this: “[Crucifixion’s] primary purpose is to emphasize the victim’s final and irrevocable rejection 
from the civic and international community and the total denial of any form of legal protection 
based on rights guaranteed…to any legal status above slavery.”
121
 Crucifixion was therefore a 
complete legal and societal condemnation upon the accused. It was of course a loss of legal 
protection as the Roman government itself would carry it out. Aubert’s analysis shows, however, 
that crucifixion was also a sign of the accused’s total ostracization from the “civic community.” 
In other words, it stripped the accused of their identity as a Roman citizen. And so, Aubert 
concludes from this fact that crucifixions occurred in order to “remind the rest of the community 
of the importance of belonging to it.”
122
 Considering all of this, it is not surprising that Celsus 
views Jesus’ death as one element that “degrades” his supposedly “pure and holy” character. 
In contrast, Origen views Jesus’ death as yet further evidence of why he should be 
honored and worshipped by Christians. In 1.30, after reiterating the many ways that Jesus was 
exemplary, Origen implies that even his death on the cross was not enough to nullify the things 
that made Jesus great. He says: 
Καὶ Θεμιστοκλεῖ μὲν ἤ τινι τῶν ἐνδόξων οὐδὲν γέγονε τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῇ δόξῃ· 
τούτῳ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἱκανῶς δυναμένοις ἐν ἀδοξίᾳ καλύψαι ἀνθρώπου 
ψυχὴν καὶ πάνυ εὐφυοῦς, καὶ ὁ δοκῶν ἄτιμος εἶναι θάνατος σταυρωθέντι ἱκανὸς 
ἦν καὶ τὴν φθάσασαν δόξαν καὶ προκαταλαβοῦσαν ἐξαφανίσαι καὶ τούς, ὡς 
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οἴονται οἱ μὴ συγκατατιθέμενοι αὐτοῦ τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, προεξαπατηθέντας ποιῆσαι 
τῆς μὲν ἀπάτης ἀποστῆναι καταγνῶναι δὲ τοῦ ἀπατήσαντος. (1.30) 
 
To Themistocles or any of the other eminent men nothing happened to militate 
against their fame; but in the case of Jesus, besides the points I have mentioned 
which have sufficient influence to hide a man’s character in ignominy even if he 
were a most noble person, his death by crucifixion which seems to be disgraceful 
was enough to take away even such reputation as he had already gained, and to 
make those who had been deluded (as people who do not agree with his teaching 
think) abandon their delusion and condemn the man who had deceived them. 
 
Origen makes the point that even those who stuck with Jesus up until his death abandoned him 
because of his “disgraceful” crucifixion. In other words, most people - even some who followed 
Jesus - were turned away by the low nature of his death. Presumably, the only ones who stayed 
faithful to Jesus was the small group of apostles and others described in the Biblical book of 
Acts. Thus, Origen’s point is that despite Jesus’ birth, despite his strange deeds, and even despite 
a death that caused his own followers to abandon him, he is still worshipped by Christians. His 
name is still famous, his people still die for him, and the faith that he inspired is robust enough to 
warrant such a complex philosophical response from Celsus. This continued influence of Jesus 
beyond his death only serves to further convince Origen that his beliefs are true.  
All aspects of Jesus’ life, therefore, serve as another point on which Celsus and Origen 
agree yet conclude wildly different things. His birth, life, and death all cause Celsus to dismiss 
Jesus and are evidence enough that Jesus is certainly not any god at all. In his opinion, a god 
would not even descend to earth, let alone live in such mean circumstances.
123
 The entire 
narrative of Jesus’ incarnation and life is simply absurd and illogical. On the other hand, 
Origen’s faith is affirmed at every stage of the story about Jesus’ time on earth. The humbleness 
of his entire life only serves to magnify for Origen the hand of God in all the events that took 
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place. On this point especially, as Celsus’ and Origen’s logic can be traced step-by-step through 
Jesus’ life, it is clear how they differ so much despite starting with the same essential narrative 
about Jesus. 
 Origen also exhibits this same strategy when addressing Celsus’ critiques about the type 
of people who followed Jesus. In 1.62-1.64 of Contra Celsum, Origen discusses the following 
statement from Celsus: δέκα εἶπεν ἢ ἕνδεκά τινας ἐξαρτησάμενον τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἑαυτῷ ἐπιρρήτους 
ἀνθρώπους, τελώνας καὶ ναύτας τοὺς πονηροτάτους, μετὰ τούτων τῇδε κἀκεῖσε αὐτὸν 
ἀποδεδρακέναι, αἰσχρῶς καὶ γλίσχρως τροφὰς συνάγοντα… (1.62). “Jesus collected round him 
ten or eleven infamous men, the most wicked tax-collectors and sailors, and with these fled 
hither and thither, collecting a means of livelihood in a disgraceful and importune way.” This 
passage can be included in Celsus’ critiques of Jesus himself, as an indictment of the character of 
such a man who calls “infamous men” to follow him. Moreover, this echoes the complaints 
considered in Chapter 2 in which Celsus demonstrates his disbelief that Christians purposely call 
sinners to faith instead of righteous men. In this context, however, Celsus is primarily dealing 
with this general trend in Christianity in terms of Jesus’ own life. As such, 1.62-1.64 should be 
considered as part of Celsus’ generally low opinion of Jesus himself. 
 As Origen interacts with Celsus’ statement, he demonstrates the same pattern of 
confirmation and eventual opposition to it. Firstly, Origen acknowledges that Jesus did indeed 
call “infamous” and “wicked” men. That is, he did gather around himself simple men with no 
intelligence or righteousness to speak of. Of those disciples whose professions are mentioned, 
there were sailors and fishermen and tax-collectors. Even more, Origen says: Οὐ γὰρ ἡ εἰς τὸ 
λέγειν δύναμις καὶ τάξις ἀπαγγελίας κατὰ τὰς Ἑλλήνων διαλεκτικὰς ἢ ῥητορικὰς τέχνας ἦν ἐν 
αὐτοῖς ὑπαγομένη τοὺς ἀκούοντας (1.62). “For in them there was no power of speaking or of 
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giving an ordered narrative by the standards of Greek dialectical or rhetorical arts which 
convinced their hearers.” One can almost envision Celsus nodding along to this assessment of 
Jesus’ disciples. Of course these mean and wicked men had none of these skills. Celsus thus 
would use this only as further evidence of Jesus’ own poor character, since he has gathered men 
around him who are not only unrighteous but unintelligent. Moreover, the fact that these men 
had influence among the people is further proof of the treacherous means used by Christians to 
persuade men of their religion. He would not say that the power of their message overcame their 
personal weaknesses, but only that they had hoodwinked those with whom they interacted. 
 Origen, on the other hand, offers a different interpretation of the simple nature of Jesus’ 
disciples and the influence they gained after Jesus’ death as they spread the message of 
Christianity. He writes:  
δὲ τίς βλέπων ἁλιεῖς καὶ τελώνας…τεθαρρηκό τως οὐ μόνον Ἰουδαίοις 
ὁμιλοῦντας περὶ τῆς εἰς τὸν Ἰησοῦν πίστεως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔθνεσι 
κηρύσσον τας αὐτὸν καὶ ἀνύοντας, οὐκ ἂν ζητήσαι, πόθεν ἦν αὐτοῖς δύναμις 
πειστική; Οὐ γὰρ ἡ νενομισμένη τοῖς πολλοῖς. Καὶ τίς οὐκ ἂν λέγοι ὅτι τὸ "∆εῦτε 
ὀπίσω μου, καὶ ποιήσω ὑμᾶς ἁλιεῖς ἀνθρώπων" δυνάμει τινὶ θείᾳ ἐν τοῖς 
ἀποστόλοις αὐτοῦ ἐπλήρωσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς; (1.62) 
 
If anyone saw fisherfolk and tax-collectors...who with great courage not only 
spoke to Jews about faith in Jesus but also preached him among the other nations 
with success, would he not try to find out the source of their persuasive power? 
For it is not that which is popularly supposed to be power. Who would not say 
that Jesus had fulfilled the saying, “Come follow me, and I will make you fishers 
of men,” by a certain divine power in his apostles? 
 
Origen believes that Jesus should actually be praised for the kind of men he chose as followers. 
Since the Christian message came with so much “persuasive power,” it was natural for the ones 
to whom the disciples were preaching to ask where that power came from. If the disciples were 
accomplished and educated orators, others would believe that the power of their message came 
from the skill of the disciples. In other words, the source of their power would be from man, not 
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from God. This, however, is not consistent with greater Christian understanding. Hauck, in his 
analysis of prophecy and revelation in Origen’s and Celsus’ works, writes the following: “Origen 
contests the ability of the soul to make its own way to the knowledge of God, and asserts that the 
soul is rather in a spiritual struggle from which it cannot extricate itself without help.”
124
 Hauck 
continues: “Origen speaks of what is required for knowledge of God in varying ways. He often 
calls it simply ‘divine grace,’ or ‘superior inspiration,’ and it includes the indwelling of, or 
participation in, the Holy Spirit.”
125
 This analysis from Hauck reveals something crucial about 
Christian thought. Belief in Christianity is not something that men can gain by themselves. 
Instead, they are “extricated” from unbelief only by God’s own help and begin to know God 
when they are given that knowledge by God’s further activity in their lives. With this in mind, it 
would be foolish to say that those who preach the Christian message are bringing men to belief 
without God’s help. The best delivery of the Christian message is powerless unless God’s power 
supplements it. 
Therefore, Jesus’ choice of disciples prevents those to whom they were preaching from 
becoming confused by the true source of their power. The simplicity and baseness of his 
disciples allow men to see only the power of God within them. But, more importantly for 
considering the differences between Origen’s and Celsus’ conclusions, Jesus’ choice shows his 
own wisdom. It demonstrates the fact that Jesus anticipated that the source of Christianity’s 
power would be confused unless it was delivered by uneducated men. This is almost a 
completely opposite evaluation of Jesus’ choice of followers than what was observed in Celsus’ 
arguments and an undermining of those arguments. Celsus was simply wrong about Jesus’ 
choice of followers because he did not have the full understanding of the power of God. In this 
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way, Celsus certainly is right about the type of men Jesus chose, but his conclusion is found 
greatly wanting.   
 Even beyond this, Origen continues to refute Celsus’ indictment of Jesus’ choice of 
disciples by making two additional critiques. The first of these critiques concerns Celsus’ 
omission of evidence that would seemingly support his point. Origen cites a famous comment 
from the apostle Paul in the letter now called 1 Timothy in which he describes himself as “the 
chief of sinners” (1 Timothy 1:15). If this was indeed true about one of the most notable 
Christians ever, why did Celsus not use him as an example to support his comments about the 
followers of Jesus? Origen offers this explanation of the omission:  
Εἰκὸς γὰρ ὅτι ἑώρα δεῖσθαι αὐτῷ ἀπολογίας τὸν περὶ Παύλου λόγον, πῶς διώξας 
τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πικρῶς ἀγωνισάμενος κατὰ τῶν πιστευόντων, ὡς καὶ 
εἰς θάνατον παραδιδόναι ἐθέλειν τοὺς Ἰησοῦ μαθητάς, ὕστερον ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον 
μετεβάλετο, ὡς "ἀπὸ Ἱερουσαλὴμ μέχρι τοῦ Ἰλλυρικοῦ πεπληρωκέναι τὸ 
εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ"… (1.63) 
 
[Celsus] probably saw that he would have to explain the history of Paul, how he 
persecuted the church of God and fought bitterly against the believers, so that he 
even wanted to deliver to death Jesus’ disciples, but afterwards was so profoundly 
converted that from Jerusalem to Illyricum he had fully preached the gospel of 
Christ… 
 
Origen essentially accuses Celsus of purposely not mentioning Paul because doing so would 
actually prove Origen’s interpretation correct. As Origen indicates here, Paul truly was living 
sinfully in the eyes of Christians. In actively seeking to kill Christians, he was extremely 
“infamous” and “wicked.” Thus, his later conversion is one major proof that Jesus was actually 
wise in choosing unrighteous men as his followers. For though those followers may be the chief 
of sinners, they are still able to be converted by the great message of Christianity. The apostle 




 The next critique that Origen makes about Celsus’ argument is that Christianity is not 
alone in its ability to be criticized for the kind of people it attracts. He writes: Εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ 
προτέρῳ βίῳ ὀνειδίζειν μέλλοιμεν τοῖς μεταβαλοῦσιν, ὥρα καὶ Φαίδωνος ἡμᾶς κατηγορεῖν καὶ 
φιλοσοφήσαντος, ἐπεί, ὡς ἡ ἱστορία φησίν, ἀπὸστέγους αὐτὸν μετήγαγεν εἰς φιλόσοφον 
διατριβὴν ὁ Σωκράτης (1.64). “If we were going to reproach people whose lives have changed 
on the ground of their past, we could well attack Phaedo the philosopher, since, as the story goes, 
Socrates led him out from a house of ill-fame to study philosophy.” He goes on to give more 
examples of philosophers in the Greek tradition who either came from disreputable origins yet 
still found success in philosophy, like Xenocrates’ successor Polemo, or who encouraged their 
followers to turn from licentiousness to philosophy, like Chrysippus. Looking more deeply at 
one of these philosophers helps to clarify Origen’s point. Polemo presided over the Platonic 
Academy for nearly 40 years in the late 4
th




 Greek biographer 
Diogenes Laertius records the story of Polemo’s change from a wild youth to a serious 
philosopher (Lives of Eminent Philosophers 4.3). As a wealthy young man, he wasted his time 
spending money and trying to gratify his every desire. Having stumbled drunkenly into the 
Academy during Xenocrates’ lecture on self-control, he was inspired to change his ways and 
“became so industrious that he surpassed all the other students.”
127
 The example of Polemo 
makes Origen’s point quite well, for Polemo followed a path that many Christians would have. 
At first, he was uneducated and focused only on base desires. However, having been enlightened 
by a powerful message, he is “converted” to a life of philosophy. The implication is that 
Christians are just like Polemo and Jesus just like Xenocrates, who is to be admired for so 
positively influencing wayward men. Origen therefore subtly challenges Celsus’ opinion about 
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the superiority of Platonism. If the Academy is among those philosophical schools that are 
willing to enlighten such base men, what validity is there to Celsus’ arguments that Christianity 
is inferior to Platonism because of the very same practice? Overall, then, Origen is still able to 
effectively oppose Celsus’ arguments that Jesus – and his followers after him – did seek to 
enlighten common people. 
 With each of these four aspects of Christianity, Origen displays his apologetic strategy. 
He is consistent with his approach to Celsus: always confirming his facts, yet always opposing 
his conclusions. In this way, Origen’s strategy fleshes out the opinions he put forth in his 
preface. There, he makes it clear that the best refutation of Christianity is not the written one; it is 
the one that looks to the evidence of the faith itself. Origen’s written refutation is consistently 
subject to this belief. Though he wrote against Celsus, he does so in such a way that gives 
primacy to the facts of Christianity. He does not apologize for these facts, he does not try to 
explain them away. Instead, he embraces and endorses them, using them to show the great merits 
of Christianity. It is only with this piece in place that Origen proceeds to refute Celsus in words 
and to try to persuade his readers of Celsus’ errors. If anyone who reads Origen’s work is 
persuaded by his endorsement of Christianity and comes to believe his message, it is only 
because he was shown the facts of the faith more clearly. It would not be because of Origen’s 
great rhetoric and argumentative skill; it would through his ability to disentangle the facts from 







CONCLUSION: TO KNOW NOTHING BUT JESUS CHRIST AND HIM CRUCIFIED 
This thesis has provided a glimpse into the great clash between early Christianity and its 
Graeco-Roman neighbors. The multiple different factors of this interaction – theological, 
philosophical, social, and more – are all on full display in the writings of Celsus and Origen. It is 
a privilege for readers today, whether Christian or non-Christian, to have the Λόγος Ἀληθής. 
There is simply no other work like it in its comprehensive and unrelenting commitment to 
deconstructing the claims of Christianity. Celsus’ views on Christianity’s doctrine, God, and 
followers challenge the very core of Christian belief. In a Western world so familiar with 
Christianity, Celsus’ 2
nd
-century, Graeco-Roman, Platonist perspective is extremely valuable. 
In a similar way, Origen’s apologetic strategy benefits modern readers greatly. While at 
first reading, it may not seem that Origen truly seeks to counter Celsus’ claims, this thesis has 
demonstrated that he does quite the opposite. It is true that Origen confirms much of Celsus’ 
criticisms about Christians’ evangelization of the lower classes of society, their common practice 
of interpreting Scripture allegorically, Christianity’s unoriginality, and their belief in the 
incarnation of God. However, through the acknowledgement of the truth of those facts, Origen is 
able to bring to light the erroneous nature of Celsus’ conclusions about Christianity. In this way, 
Origen is able to effectively oppose Celsus’ treatise even though his initial confirmation of it 
perhaps surprises his readers when they first come to the Contra Celsum. 
 Despite the surprising nature of his strategy, I would argue that it is one that ought to be 
imitated. As discussed at the end of Chapter 3, Origen was unapologetic about the facts of 
Christianity and, in the Contra Celsum, works hard to clarify and endorse those facts. He 
meticulously strips away the layers of falsehood with which Celsus had adorned the facts of 
Christianity and attempts to reveal their truth. However, there is one question still to be asked: 
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Where do these facts receive their power from? Or, rather, what made Origen so confident in 
these facts that he was zealous to make them clear to his audience even if it meant confirming 
such an opponent as Celsus? 
The answer to these questions lies in Scripture – an appropriate place to find answers for 
Origen’s beliefs. In 1.13 of Contra Celsum, Origen discusses verses from what is now 1 
Corinthians that I believe are the cornerstone of his apologetic strategy. While Origen does not 
cite this entire passage, he alludes to the main ideas laid out by the apostle Paul in the following 
verses: 
For the word of the cross is folly to those who are perishing, but to us who are 
being saved it is the power of God. For it is written, 
 
 “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, 
  and the discernment of the discerning I will thwart.” 
  
Where is the one who is wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this 
age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since, in the 
wisdom of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, it pleased God 
through the folly of what we preach to save those who believe. For Jews demand 
signs and Greeks seek wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block 
to Jews and folly to Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, 
Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is 
wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men. (1 Corinthians 
1:18-25) 
 
The teaching of this passage essentially lays out what the interaction is between Christianity and 
an unbelieving world – exactly the interaction this thesis has been exploring through the 
examples of Origen and Celsus. And Paul’s response to an unbelieving world is precisely that 
which Origen imitates. All men hear the same words about Christianity. The “word of the cross” 
and Jesus’ death on it is clearly laid out to everyone. There are no questions, in other words, 
what the facts of Christianity are. Chief among those facts are that Jesus died on the cross and 
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rose 3 days later, but Celsus and Origen’s interaction shows that all other facts about Christianity 
are easily known.  
In response to these facts, however, there are two reactions: belief and disbelief. Celsus 
and Origen are proof that Christianity produces either one of these two starkly contrasting 
reactions. Some men, on encountering Christianity, are completely repulsed by it – as Celsus 
was. Others, however, are completely attracted to it – as Origen was. As this passage from 1 
Corinthians frames it, Christianity is either foolishness or wisdom. And, ultimately, the reaction 
of an individual to the facts of Christianity depends on the power of God himself. As Paul writes 
in verses 20-21: “Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since, in the wisdom 
of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, it pleased God through the folly of what 
we preach to save those who believe.” As this Scripture teaches, it is God alone who makes men 
see that the “wisdom of the world” is foolish and that the supposed “folly” of the Christian 
message is actually wise. In other words, without this activity of God, no man would believe. 
“For,” as Pauls says in verses 22-24, “Jews demand signs and Greeks seek wisdom, but we 
preach Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles, but to those who are 
called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.” Jews and 
Greeks – essentially all unconverted people – seek for truth in signs, in philosophical wisdom, in 
any number of things. They certainly would not seek it in the foolish message of Christians if it 
was not for God calling them and making them see his “power” and “wisdom” in that message. 
It was this unwavering belief in the power of God that led Paul to “preach Christ crucified” 
despite the opposition that message brought. And it was the same belief in Origen that led to his 
unique apologetic strategy. He deeply understood the teaching of this passage in 1 Corinthians. 
As he writes in 1.13, Αὐτόθεν γὰρ κηρυσσόμενος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐσταυρωμένος μωρία ἐστὶ 
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κηρύγματος· “For it is manifest that the preaching of Jesus Christ as crucified is the foolishness 
of preaching.” He understood that the preaching of Christ crucified – and all the other truths that 
adorn this central doctrine – was folly to the world. He read Celsus’ Λόγος Ἀληθής and saw in 
him a Greek seeking wisdom and only finding folly in the Christian message. Like Paul, he did 
not rush to obscure the facts of Christianity since they had not persuaded Celsus in the first place. 
Indeed, he did the exact opposite. Recognizing the blindness of Celsus to Christian truth and 
relying on the power of God, he was unashamed and bold in proclaiming the truth of Christ 
crucified and of all those aspects of Christianity discussed in this thesis. For what else but the 
power of God could persuade Celsus?  
As such, modern Christians find in Origen a man totally convinced by the facts of 
Christianity, totally reliant on the power of God, and totally unashamed in preaching about what 
he knew to be true. In this way, Origen is a great encouragement to all Christians and an 
inspiration to any Christian apologist. If Christians truly do believe in the power of God and the 
activity of God in lives of men, what better way to live out that belief than to be unapologetic in 
proclaiming the truth of Christianity? It would have been easy for Origen to capitulate to Celsus’ 
attacks. It is no doubt that Celsus presented many opportunities for Origen to apologize for 
Christianity and water down its message. Origen, however, never did so. If he could do so in the 
face of such an attack as Celsus’, what then should stop Christians from following his example? 
For, indeed, Origen is right to point out in his preface the teaching of Romans 8:38-39: “neither 
death nor life, nor angels nor rulers, nor things present nor things to come, nor powers, nor 
height nor depth, nor anything else in all creation,” – including the attacks of men like Celsus – 
“will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord.” Christians, then, 
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should follow in the footsteps of Paul and Origen who did not hesitate to preach about this Christ 
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